American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

2-1-2011

Contentious politics in the Maghreb: a comparative study of
mobilization in Tunisia and Morocco
Johan Rognlie Roko

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds

Recommended Citation

APA Citation
Roko, J. (2011).Contentious politics in the Maghreb: a comparative study of mobilization in Tunisia and
Morocco [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1062

MLA Citation
Roko, Johan Rognlie. Contentious politics in the Maghreb: a comparative study of mobilization in Tunisia
and Morocco. 2011. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1062

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN THE MAGHREB:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MOBILIZATION
IN TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Political Science
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts

By

Johan Rognlie Roko
Under the supervision of Dr.

Bahgat Korany

November 2011

The American University in Cairo

CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN THE MAGHREB
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MOBILIZATION IN TUNISIA
AND MOROCCO
A Thesis Submitted by

Johan Rognlie Roko
To the Department of Political Science
November 2011
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
The degree of Master of Arts
Has been approved by
Dr. (Type the name of the faculty member)
Thesis Committee Advisor____________________________________________
Affiliation_________________________________________________________
Dr. (Type the name of the faculty member)
Thesis Committee Reader____________________________________________
Affiliation_________________________________________________________
Dr. (Type the name of the faculty member)
Thesis Committee Reader____________________________________________
Affiliation_________________________________________________________

__________________
Dept. Chair

__________
Date

__________________ ____________
Dean of HUSS
Date

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....................................................................................v
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................vi

PART I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................7
I.1 Delimitation and Objectives of the Thesis …..........................10
I.2 Methods of the Study...............................................................12
PART II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
REVIEW OF THEORY................................................................16
II.1
II.2

State-society Relations and the Authoritarian Order...........16
Theory Review on Contentious Politics..............................25

PART III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES AND
AUTHORITARIAN STAGNATION............................................35
III.1 Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment.......................35
III.2 Unemployment and Educational Reform…………………40
III.3 The Rhetoric of Reform and
the Reality of Authoritarian Renewal.................................42
III.4 The Worsening Problem of Corruption.............................. 47
III.5 Limitations on Civil Society in Tunisia and Morocco........53
III.6 The recent Economic Crisis and
Accumulated Socio- economic Pressures...........................59
III.7 New Discourses and Popular Responses............................62
III.8 Laying the Groundwork for Protests: A Summary..............65

iii

PART IV. MOBILIZATION UNDER ADVERSE
CONDITIONS..............................................................................67
IV.1
IV.2
IV.3
IV.4
IV.5

Articulating Grievances and Mobilizing Consensus..........67
Mobilization Online and in the Streets...............................78
Civil Society and the Popular Movement in Tunisia..........85
The Response of the Ben Ali Regime.................................91
The February 20 Movement and
Mobilization in Morocco....................................................94

PART V. CONCLUSION......................................................................115
REFERENCES......................................................................................122
ANNEX I: LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS...........................130
ANNEX II: INFORMED CONSENT FORM......................................131
ANNEX III: DRAFT INTERVIEW GUIDE........................................133

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table I. Percentage of Individuals using the Internet in
Tunisia and Morocco 2009-2010..................................................63

Table II. Literacy Rates and Gross Enrollment in
Tertiary Education in Tunisia and Morocco..................................64

Table III: Estimates of Casualties in Tunisia and Morocco 2011..........110

Table IV: Overview of structural and discursive variables for..............121
Tunisia and Morocco

v

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the processes of socio-economic and political change
leading up to the most recent upheavals in the Arab World, with a focus on Tunisia
and Morocco. A comparative study of the different historical trajectories of these
countries is useful to identify causes for variation between countries that share many
cultural, historical, socio-economic, and also political characteristics. The thesis
illustrates how these countries have liberalized their economies without liberalizing
their polities to the same extent, a process that has undermined regime legitimacy
gradually over many years.
In Tunisia the worsening marginalization for growing segments of the
population led to massive unrest. When exploring how such mobilization was
possible under repressive conditions, I suggest that a combination of “traditional”
mobilization by means of NGOs, and “new” mobilization via social media produced
powerful tools for channeling popular discontent, articulated as oppositional
discourse.
The visible political opportunities for protests in Tunisia were not many, but
the new, shared discourses of alienation and indignation compelled people to act. In
Morocco, contention has been a more moderate and drawn-out affair throughout the
spring and summer of 2011. The thesis contrasts mobilization in these two countries,
and suggests that differences in regime type, levels of socio-economic development
and class configuration, as well as patterns of interaction between regimes and
protesters, may explain most of the variation in how mobilization unfolded, and
which concessions the state has yielded.
vi

I - Introduction
The winter and spring months of 2010 and 2011 proved momentous in
contemporary Middle Eastern history. Beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, mass
protests spread like wildfire, and took the autocratic regimes of Tunisia and Egypt
completely by surprise. The wave of contention has touched almost all Arab
countries in what has been termed “The Arab Spring”. With presidents toppled in
Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli, and the leaders of Syria and Yemen under unprecedented
pressure, the events have also challenged many previous postulates about the
resilience of authoritarian regimes in Arab states.
Maybe this perspective of stagnation has been so common because studies of
Arab countries have had a bias towards analyzing the elite level, when incremental
change has in fact occurred at the popular level (Korany 2010, 7-8). Processes of
socio-economic change, a reconfiguration of state-society relations, and the advent of
globalization and new communications technologies have all affected the Middle
East. The events of spring 2011 clearly prove that the social, economic, and political
pressures of the last years have become a burden too heavy to bear for a growing
number of people; and that the authoritarian regimes in the region had been
incapable of addressing the grievances of those people. These gradual processes of
change deserve further study.
The puzzle, however, remains that authoritarian regimes typically keep all
challenges in check - by means of repression, co-optation, and pre-emption. Arab
regimes have resorted to a discourse of political liberalization over the last two
decades, often in response to external pressure. However, numerous investigations
have demonstrated that this “liberalization” has existed only on paper, or that
7

authoritarian leaders have mastered a subtle game where any contestation has taken
place either among factions inside a corporatist structure, or within a tightly
monitored sphere of parties and civil society. Therefore, I must examine how
widespread mobilization and opposition could upset this order so suddenly, and how
popular movements managed to gain the momentum they did.
This thesis seeks to understand why this mobilization occurred, and how it
could gain the momentum it did in the authoritarian contexts of Tunisia and
Morocco. The comparison of socio-economic and socio-political contexts in these
two countries will inform our study of how different protest movements did emerge,
and why their impacts have been different.
Using a comparative study should help identifying and discussing relevant
factors, notably by contrasting different outcomes in terms of protests and showing
which variables have conditioned the scale and significance of these protests.
There are many perspectives in political science, economics, or political
sociology that could be used to frame this discussion. The Gramsci School would
surely focus on the undermining of hegemonic regimes and the transformation of
means and relations of production in the region. Beatrice Hibou (2006; 2011) has a
totally different point of departure, and uses the micro-sociological vocabulary of
Michel Foucault to portray how authoritarian power in Tunisia was infused within
the most mundane bureaucratic and economic processes. One could also draw upon
the “Structures of Contestation”- model of Ellen Lust-Okar (2005). For lack of space,
these approaches will not be included here; instead I opt for a framework of Social
Movement Theories, and of studying how authoritarian corporatism has prevented an
autonomous civil society from emerging in the region (see for instance Schmitter
8

1974).
The thesis focuses on the cases of Tunisia and Morocco in the sub-region of
Francophone North Africa. These countries have adopted many of the same
economic policies over the years, but their political regimes have evolved differently.
Their socio-economic development levels are also different. All in all, however, I
argue that one can compare relevant dimensions across the two cases.
Social Movement Theories (SMT) contains a range of tools for understanding
mobilization processes under various political regimes. Nevertheless, most social
movement models have been derived from a “Western” context, and presuppose the
existence of a civil society that can act as driving force for mass contentious politics.
Part two of this thesis therefore conducts a qualitative, empirical study of how
mobilization could take place under the authoritarian conditions of Tunisia and
Morocco. I conducted interviews with activists in the two countries to explore these
phenomena, which have been widely covered in the global media, but which have
not been the objects of much academic study as of yet.
Subsequently, I argue that mobilization in these countries represents a
fascinating combination of traditional mobilization processes and the application of
“new” communication resources that enabled the emergence of new popular
discourse. In order to understand how discontent grows under authoritarian
conditions when associative life is co-opted, I borrowed insights from social
constructivist Social Movement Theories. Critics describe SMT as lacking in
parsimony and clarity, and being so eclectic and contingent that it explains virtually
“everything and nothing”. On the other hand, qualitative research should allow for
variables and research design to be embedded in a specific social and political
9

context. I find social constructivist Social Movement Theory to be a broad
perspective and meta-theory pointing more at where the researcher should focus than
exactly which variables he or she must include.
When applied together with elements of a Political-Opportunity-Structure
(POS) model of social movements, and a model of authoritarian corporatist regimes,
I argue that the social constructivist framework proves useful for the purpose of this
study. Of course, the analysis of new and unfolding phenomena in the Middle East
might enable us to test and critique pre-established conceptual models, and possibly
suggest modifications to such models. On a broader scale, theorists might argue
whether Social Movement Theories derived from a “Western context” have universal
applicability and can be transposed to the Middle Eastern context at all. All these
questions should improve further studies of contentious politics in the Middle East.

10

I. Delimitation and Objectives of the Thesis

This study will highlight the most recent, and still ongoing, contention in
Tunisia and Morocco. Furthermore, it will focus on the mostly secular, youth-led
mobilization for political liberalization and improved economic opportunities that
has taken place. It will only mention other forms of contention, such as Islamist
protests, when these are relevant to the main objectives. The research puzzle
concerning mobilization under an authoritarian state compels us to ask two
questions, which are interlinked.

•

First, why did contentious politics materialize in the recent socio-economic
and socio-political contexts in both cases observed?

•

Second, how did mobilization attain various degrees of intensity and impact
in Tunisia and in Morocco?
The claims made by protesters obviously reflect their sense of grievance and

injustice about current socio-economic and political conditions. The first objective
must therefore be to map out major developments that have undermined the status
quo (or the ancien régime in the case of Tunisia). The first empirical section of the
study traces and compares the socio-economic troubles of Tunisia and Morocco all
the way back to deficient policies in the 1970s and 1980s.
Secondly, this thesis will investigate how these grievances were translated
into action. In order to address this puzzle, theories on contentious politics will be
applied, looking at political opportunities and constraints/threats, the generation of
collective action frames, and the relationship between regimes and protest
11

movements. These concepts will also help clarifying why protests in Tunisia and
Morocco evolved along quite different paths.

I.2 Methods of the study1
This study will employ mostly qualitative research methods, and will be
based on primary sources in the form of interviews, and secondary sources such as
scholarly articles, books, web logs (blogs), and analytic and journalistic material
retrieved online.

I.2.1 A Comparative Approach

A comparative study begs that I define accurately the concepts that are being
studied and compared. Our two Maghreb cases share numerous cultural, historical,
societal and religious characteristics. I argue in this thesis that their regimes and civil
societies also share relevant features, despite the apparent differences between a
1

Research Ethics and Informed Consent
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the American University in Cairo had
approved the ethical aspects of the research on May 29, 2011, prior to any field research
(Please refer to Annex II). There is always an element of uncertainty pertaining to informed
consent (Beauchamp, et al. 1982). Respondents might not have knowledge of social science
research methods or terminology, and they have no means of knowing how the data might be
disseminated at a later stage. However, the subjects of this research can be considered
autonomous – they are generally outspoken, educated, resourceful individuals, and I
assumed that they were capable of assessing the consequences of their own participation.
In any case, since I was interacting with human subjects in a volatile political
environment, I followed a number of guidelines to reduce the risk for my interviewees.
Notably, I decided not to use a recording device. Not recording the responses on tape
unavoidably affects the reliability of data (Silverman 2010, 240). To strengthen the quality of
the final analysis, however, I have quoted direct extracts from the responses given, and kept
the discussion closely tied to the set of responses obtained. This should help in understanding
how I investigated the topic and analyzed the data (Ibid, 300).
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traditional monarchy like Morocco and Tunisia’s republican regime. Moreover, the
two countries can be compared to the rest of North Africa or the Middle East, and the
surge in protests across the region during the spring of 2011 points to the fact that
many countries in the region have similar social, economic and political problems.
Tunisia and Morocco are comparable because they do not have significant oil
rent, unlike many Arab countries. Their political economies have therefore developed
differently from neighboring Algeria, for instance. The lack of rentier states would
seem to indicate that the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes are less immune to
repeated societal pressures and economic crises. In comparison with other Middle
Eastern regimes, Tunisia and Morocco have remained remarkably stable until
recently, and their regimes have maintained a pro-Western orientation since
independence (Pfeifer 1999).
I opt for a flexible comparative design inspired by the Most Similar Systems
research design (MSSD) (Landman 2003). Due to a lack of space I will not elaborate
further on background and control variables such as cultural, linguistic, historical and
other features which Tunisia and Morocco share. The research design used here
focuses on finding one or more independent variables which vary across the cases
and may explain a given dependent variable, given that other dimensions are
approximately similar. Although a complex dimension in itself, the outcome I want
to focus on here is the degree of contention. A more specific conceptualization of
this dimension will be given later.
The research design should allow for a study of how contentious politics in
one country inspired protests in another, while differences in state-society relations
and the articulation of grievances conditioned the outcomes of protests. I will single
13

out both general dimensions and more specific factors that appear to explain some of
the variance between our cases, but I will not claim that these determine any
outcomes, or that they are the sole relevant variables to the comparison. The
numerous processes studied here are highly nuanced, and a thesis cannot do them all
justice. Besides the differences, we shall also explore the similarities between the
countries, which pertain particularly to our question of why protests have erupted.
When undertaking qualitative analysis based on survey data and socioeconomic database materials, it is important to keep in mind the possible
shortcomings of such data sets, especially when they concern developing countries
(Richards and Waterbury 2008, 10, 134, 274). Collection of accurate data in such
settings is often very difficult, and available data might have been distorted for
political purposes.

I.2.2 Interviews: A tool for exploratory research

For the second main empirical chapter of this thesis, I chose to conduct semistructured interviews with activists, bloggers and protest organizers in main cities in
Tunisia and Morocco (Tunis, Sousse, Rabat, and Marrakesh). The interview guide
(please refer to Annex III) contained the main questions and themes that I wanted to
touch upon, but the interviews did not have to adhere strictly to this guide; as the
interviews proceeded, I sometimes wanted to follow up on interesting points with
additional questions, and the interviewees were quite free to elaborate on themes
they found important. As a minimum, however, I sought to ensure that all topics were
14

covered at each interview – this to permit that a proper comparison could be made
and common trends in the material analyzed.
Time and resource constraints, limitations on the availability of information
about individual activists and their role, and geographical distance, set restrictions on
the ways I could find suitable persons to interview. I cannot claim that the activists I
talked to were representative of the larger population of activists in each country, and
even less that they are representative of the crowds of protesters who joined them in
Tunis, Casablanca, Rabat, and elsewhere.
A small sample size (20) and the unknown degree of representability in turn
affected the reliability of the results obtained. One may also discuss critically the
validity of any inference derived from in-depth interviews. One should always reflect
on whether interviewees will use a different discourse and emphasize different things
when they talk to researchers than when they interact with their own social
environment. The interview setting is a specific social setting which affects the
content and form of communication between interviewer and interviewee, and the
data retrieved are in essence subjective narratives conveyed by the interviewee.
Finally, the wording of questions will inevitably affect the responses obtained, both
in terms of the content and the discourse used to convey the content (Silverman
2010, 128, 225; Roulston, de Marrais, and Lewis 2003, 654) 2.

2

studies.

Silverman also brings up the problems associated with carrying out retrospective

For this particular study, events in Morocco have unfolded until the present day,
while the mobilization phase I focus on in Tunisia took place about a year ago – which
might affect the answers people give, because people generally view the past “through the
lens of the present” (Silverman 2010, 192). However, the popular contention in Tunisia took
a long time to subside, and the mass protests in January 2011 are still in a past so recent that
I find it justifiable to ask for recollections of these events from interviewees.
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II - Conceptual Framework and Theory Review

II.1 State-society relations and the authoritarian corporatist
order

In order to study the recent surge in contentious politics in the Middle East, it
is necessary to define key concepts and develop a theoretical framework. The
fundamental argument that contentious politics “emerge from groups in society
which advance claims against the state” (Goldstone 2001, 142) begs a further study
of how regimes in Tunisia and Morocco related to their respective societies, and
more specifically, to organized civil society: to labor unions, professional
associations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), among others. Both
regimes used co-optation, manipulation, repression and subjugation alternatively and
in varying doses to control major organized groups in society. These mechanisms
have worked in slightly different ways in monarchic Morocco and republican
Tunisia, but I argue in line with Eshteshami and Murphy (1996, 757) that the two
political orders have been comparable nonetheless.
Both represent varieties of a Middle Eastern authoritarian corporatist state,
and scholars argue further that these are examples of states ruled by means of an
“authoritarian bargain”. This means that civil society has mostly remained
acquiescent and loyal to the regime, which has provided a degree of social justice,
economic security, and development in return. The concept of an “authoritarian
contract” or “ruling bargain” in Middle Eastern states has been shared widely among
16

analysts (Al Sayyid 1995, 139; Brumberg 1995, 233; Paczynska 2010, 36). This
notion has also been contested, but I adopt it here with the knowledge that it requires
substantial contextualization and nuance to be useful. In the Middle East, Kamrava
(2007, 202) argues that the authoritarian bargain has been characterized by intra-elite
conflicts, leading to the prevailing elite creating a direct link to the masses. Such
populist authoritarianism (Brumberg 1995, 233) built on a pervasive ideology, which
claimed that society constituted an “organic whole”, where the various components
are obliged to function together in harmony. As we shall see, the Moroccan
government has never espoused this ideology formally, but it has used corporatist
mechanisms and a substantial public sector to develop the country and retain its grip
on power (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 198-201). Middle Eastern regimes have
typically developed special relationships with certain constituencies within the state,
for instance organized labor, civil servants or state-owned enterprises, and offered
them considerable side-payments for their loyalty (Kamrava 2007, 202).
The objective of corporatism has been to tone down class politics and other
horizontal loyalties, which rulers have perceived as disruptive. It is clear that many
Middle Eastern governments have preferred to institutionalize vertical bonds
between the state and sectors of social and economic life, in order to control
potentially rival loci of power (see Schmitter 1974, 93-94, 106). In republics such as
Tunisia, the one-party state embodied the corporatist model. Leaders and cadres of
the single party controlled the state, and used internal channels to mediate with
different interest groups (Anderson 1986, 232-250). Society was organized along
economic sectors, and the segmentation of workers into different, and often rivaling,
unions, which were kept under tight political control, prevented potential class
17

mobilization. Challenges to this order were denounced as undermining national
cohesion, and were swiftly suppressed (Eshteshami & Murphy 1996, 755).
As the vertical ties between the state and certain constituencies deepened, the
two became increasingly dependent on each other, which further kept challenges to
the state's dominance in check. The establishment of such ties often happened in
informal ways: The extension of a patrimonial system emanating from the executive
has been a typical feature of Middle Eastern regimes. Clientelistic networks were
often twinned with more overt political control of associations, such as in Tunisia, or
they thrived as informal bonds between the regime and organizations that were
seemingly autonomous, such as in Morocco.
In the case of Moroccan politics, analysts have underlined the importance of
the Makhzen as the “backbone” of the state. The concept of Makhzen has become
synonymous with central power in contemporary Morocco. This network is clearly
clientelistic, and links the monarchy to various individuals, associations and
institutions, while “controlling power networks, patrimonial exchanges, and
distribution of wealth” (Layachi 1998, 31). The Makhzen also includes much of
associative life, and Brumberg (1995) concludes that authoritarian corporatism,
clientelist largesse, and a weak and subordinate civil society are all complementary
and reinforcing phenomena.
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II.1.1 Civil society under authoritarian corporatism

There has been a lively debate concerning whether the term “civil society”, in
its liberal, Lockean sense, can be applied in the Middle Eastern context at all. Locke
and de Tocqueville represent the tradition where autonomous organized interests are
viewed as posing a necessary and useful counterweight to the state (Layachi 1998,
13-14). From a liberal view, civil society is commonly viewed as the “organization of
society at the level between the family and the state” (Brynen, Korany and Noble
1995, 11).
Moreover, observers who approach Middle Eastern societies from a liberal
perspective will typically include an aspect of “civility” in their definition of civil
society: Organizations only form part of this vision of “civil society” if they adhere
to principles of pluralism, moderation, and tolerance of different views. Hence, many
analysts have tended to exclude Islamist associations in the Middle East from their
notion of civil society, because they have perceived the latter as authoritarian and
intolerant (Zubaida 1992, 3). This exclusionary categorization can be problematic,
because Islamist organizations have typically been much more successful than other
movements in the Middle East (Sater 2007). The liberal view is of course that a
modern, vibrant and pluralistic civil society is a necessary vehicle to advance
political liberalization and democratization in authoritarian states.
There have been diverging views on the actual influence of liberal civil
society organizations in the Middle East. Especially organizations working on human
rights, political liberalization, and democratization issues, have more often than not
been described as weak, fragmented, and numerically few, although their conditions
19

have improved over the years. They have also been characterized as “disconnected”
from large segments of the population in the respective countries. Due to the difficult
conditions for advocacy organizations under repressive conditions, it is also typical
that some of the most successful organizations in the region have been de-politicized
charities (Kandil 2010, 48-49).
Different explanations have been suggested for why Arab civil society is
weak. From our discussion of authoritarian corporatism above, it is clear that the
state has sought to tie all economic and social sectors of the country to itself in a
hierarchical fashion, which has weakened the autonomy of the associative sphere.
Especially organizations representing organized labor, students, lawyers and other
key political forces have been co-opted, and regimes tried for decades to negotiate
special relationships with resourceful constituencies of the middle classes,
constituencies which could otherwise challenge the current order and lead regime
change. Additionally, of course, regimes such as the Tunisian and Moroccan ones
have always been able to wield a variety of economic, legal, and police tools against
any elements of civil society viewed as challenging the status quo.
There are Orientalist scholars who have argued that authoritarian corporatism
and its accompanying docile civil society constitute the “natural” socio-political
order in Middle Eastern societies, because it conforms to the essence of the region’s
Islamic culture. However, these arguments carry an essentialist bias, and disregard
historical path-dependent developments such as colonialism, the weakness of the
indigenous capitalist middle class, and super power meddling in domestic affairs
during the Cold War, which were not conducive to the founding of liberal
democracies on the “Western” model (Zubaida 1993, 123).
20

II.1.3 Economic order and economic reform under authoritarianism

The recent protests in Tunisia and Morocco reflect the economic grievances
of an increasing number of people, grievances that are echoed by calls for political
reform. Arab states have been compelled to liberalize their economies over the last
three decades, and this in turn has made them less able to deliver on their end of the
authoritarian bargain (Paczynska 2010, 37).
The authoritarian corporatist order is fundamentally economic as well as
political, and the ambitious development plans and socioeconomic visions that were
adopted by most Middle Eastern states after World War II led to a heavy statist
involvement in their respective economies. Middle Eastern regimes typically
mobilized around an ideology of economic redistribution and social justice, and they
therefore also dismissed the private sector as a reliable partner in the development
venture. In any case, indigenous entrepreneurial classes were usually small and
relatively weak in financial terms, and perceived as too closely tied to foreign
commercial interests as well as too reminiscent of colonial times, to play any great
role in the newly independent states (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 181).
Along with the state’s predominant role in the economy came its authoritarian
political program of corporatist bargains and the rally around the national interest,
with political liberalization put on hold indefinitely. This statist involvement was
almost as extensive in the traditional Middle Eastern monarchies as in the fledgling
republics (Ibid, 202). State-led development was generally flawed, however: Importsubstitution industrialization (ISI), centralized price and import controls, and the
exponential expansion of the public sector engendered major structural deficiencies
21

(Brumberg 1995, 234). Countries across the region were often financing expensive
welfare and education programs, while subsidizing the prices of some staple foods
and key commodities. Import substitution industrialization, for its part, turned into a
daunting logistical and technological challenge that required considerable imports.

State interventionism in the economy proved inefficient and conducive to
worsening corruption and clientelism. Public sector officials engaged in rent-seeking
rather than achieving greater productivity3. Due to the fact that authoritarian systems
legitimized their rule with a populist program of employment and development, and
in reality used massive clientelism to buy political acquiescence, regimes across the
Middle East were loath to enforce major changes in this system (Farsoun and
Zacharia 1995, 262). Ultimately, though, countries across the board ran into balanceof-payments crises, and had to request loans from the international monetary
institutions. With these loans came demands for economic austerity and structural
adjustment of their economies (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 220). Structural
adjustment normally entailed the following points: Fiscal discipline, tax reform,
liberalization of interest rates, the streamlining of exchange rates, trade liberalization,
encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI), privatization, deregulation and
securing property rights (Williamson 1990, cited in Richards and Waterbury 2008,
229).
As Richards and Waterbury (Ibid. 221) point out, this process was inevitably
painful. The standards of living for people on fixed incomes declined, unemployment
3 Richards and Waterbury (2008, 17) define rent-seeking behavior as the search for strategic
privileges in domestic markets, privileges that the public authorities often control. Evans (1995, 34
cited in Kamrava 2007) enumerates rentier mechanisms such as controlling remittance flows,
rationing foreign exchange, restricting import licenses and tariffs etc. These were frequently used
in the Maghreb.
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soared – even among the highly educated, and groups that had enjoyed corporatist
privileges under the old system found themselves under aggravating economic and
social pressures (Farsoun and Zacharia 1995, 263). This pertained increasingly to the
middle class groups – civil servants, employees of state-owned corporations and so
on – which were so crucial to the authoritarian bargain from the outset.
Unemployment soared among recent graduates who had expected to be incorporated
into the existing structures. This led to repeated crises and social unrest in all
countries concerned, to which regimes increasingly answered with repression.
Leaders adopted a discourse of economic and political transformation in
response, but the restructuring did not lead to genuine democratization in any Arab
country. Elections were held in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan, and censorship
of the press and restrictions on forming associations were relaxed in several
countries. Observers tended to believe that Arab countries would join the “Third
Wave of Democratization” that was simultaneously taking place in Latin America,
Eastern Europe, and elsewhere (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 373-374).
However, reforms were quickly abandoned and authoritarian practices
reasserted in all these countries, except maybe Morocco. Part of explaining the
different outcomes on our dependent variable must be exactly to contrast these
regime mechanisms between Tunisia and Morocco. More generally, Eshteshami and
Murphy (1996, 763) argue that the brief democratic interlude was only intended to
defuse political tensions while painful economic reforms were carried out. As
Luciani stated, “countries revert to democratic rule in times of economic crisis,
including IMF-imposed structural adjustment packages” (1988, 463). Ultimately, the
new, liberalized economic order has not been mirrored by enduring political
23

liberalization.
As a result, regime legitimacy has declined over time, as the successes of
Islamist groups, and the surge in riots observed across the Middle East, testify to.
The failed political liberalization in Algeria from 1988 to 1992, and riots in
Moroccan cities, such as in Fes in 1990, has also been the focus of French
scholarship on the Maghreb. LeSaout and Rollinde (1999) discuss the prevalence of
riots in their Émeutes et Mouvements sociaux au Maghreb. They see riots as
symptoms of a growing opposition and as “safety valves” for people to let off anger
against increasingly exclusionary forms of authoritarianism and economic liberalism.
Conceptually, they view riots as a “language” of contention in closed political
systems where no other meaningful channel for expressing grievances exists.
The French authors also emphasize the limited scope of riots: The reach and
duration of the latter are limited, and rioters most often mobilize around basic
economic grievances such as the price of bread. Hence, the Maghreb regimes have
grown accustomed to these disturbances, and have developed the repressive
capacities to quell them (Gallisot 1989). Le Saout and Rollinde (1999, 28) concur
with Gallisot (1989) that the nationalist development project in the Maghreb has
broken down. The regional states have turned into predatory apparatuses at the
disposal of the new bourgeoisie of business, bureaucrat, and police/army elites,
which they label l’État-policier and l’État-business. The question then becomes how
the 2010-2011 protests could move from riots to “revolution”, for which the North
African governments were not prepared.
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II.2 Theory Review on Contentious Politics

To understand how widespread and sustained mobilization actually
materialized in Morocco and Tunisia, I need to add an extra dimension to our
conceptual framework. The socio-economic decline I sketched above resulted in
economic and political grievances, but this does not tell us how it was possible to
bring people out to contest these conditions. Sidney Tarrow (1998, 142), a theorist of
social movements, defines a cycle of contention as follows: “a phase of heightened
conflict across the social system; (…) the creation of new or transformed collective
action frames, a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and
sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and
authorities”. It is clear that the sudden rise of protest movements in the Arab world
since December 2010 represents such a cycle. Social movement studies, an
interdisciplinary sub-field of the social sciences, suggest tools to approach and
dissect these complex processes. This diverse sub-field draws upon political science,
political psychology, and sociology, among others.
Marxist works have undoubtedly influenced strands of social movement
studies, but the main approaches that I apply in this thesis all have a liberal
inclination. In fact, the studies of collective behavior that predated social movement
studies placed much emphasis on individual rationality and self-interest. Mancur
Olson (1965) posited that the classic “free-rider” problem made it an apparent
paradox that rational individuals would organize into social movements in the first
place, and he ended up suggesting a new framework for understanding how such
organization could occur (DeFay 1999, 19). Inspired by Olson, theorists forged what
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became known as the resource mobilization approach. The theory kept the
assumptions and precepts of methodological individualism, but scholars tended to
use decisions made at the organizational level as starting point for analysis (Tarrow
1998, 16; DeFay 1999, 20).
The resource mobilization model was soon criticized for making problematic
assumptions about rational individuals and the dynamics of organizations, and for
ignoring the importance of ideology and collective identity for mobilizing people.
New approaches such as social constructivism, post-positivism, and the general
“cultural and linguistic turn” in the social sciences inspired a new generation of
academics. Charles Tilly, although not a social constructivist himself, was one of the
prominent social movement theorists who singled out the unsolved conceptual
challenge of determining whether external causal mechanisms, or rather purposive
agency, drove contention forward (1978, 6).
Social constructivism focused especially on the importance of framing:
Frames are interpretative schemes that people use to make sense of events and to
guide collective action (Snow 1986). McAdam (1982, 51) stated: “before collective
action can get underway, people must collectively define their situations as unjust”.
When people are going through such a collective process, one observes the
generation of a mobilization potential (Kriesi et al. 1995, 5). social constructivists
have further suggested that social movements strive to achieve frame alignment –
which means that they make use of collective frames that resonate with the
individual frames of people they try to mobilize (Snow 1986) 4.
4 Curtis and Zurcher (1973, 53) also present the notion of multi-organizational fields, which are
defined as the totality of organizations with which the social movement might establish linkages.
The configuration of multi-organizational fields might affect the strength and coherence of a social
movement – not all alliances of relevant organizations are necessarily supportive of the movement
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Frame production and alignment are clearly discursive and intersubjective
processes. Intersubjectivity refers to shared meanings constructed by people in
interaction with each other, and the process by which these shared meanings are
continuously contested and renegotiated within a group. Formulating the concept of
intersubjectivity was arguably an attempt to move beyond the methodological
individualism of Olson and others (Melucci 1995, 45).
Dutch researcher Bert Klandermans suggested that these shared beliefs form
the basis for a two-step mobilization process (1984, 586). Consensus mobilization is
the process whereby a movement or a cluster of organizations attempts to gain as
much support as possible for the collective good they seek to promote. Action
mobilization is Klandermans’s term for the act of calling people up to protest, and it
presupposes that consensus mobilization has taken place beforehand.
The Political-Opportunity-Structure (POS) approach is a different model,
owing in part to the path-breaking work of Charles Tilly (1978), and later Doug
McAdam (1981). Tarrow (1998, 19-20) specifies that the POS model focuses on
changes in political opportunity structures external to the social movement itself, but
accepts that it is complementary to the social constructivist paradigm, which he also
treats at length. Tarrow purports that “people engage in contentious politics when
patterns of political opportunities and constraints change”. Political opportunities are
defined as a perceived set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge:
“consistent (…) dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage
in contentious politics.” The constraints are defined as “factors – like repression, but

(cited in Klandermans 1997, 142).
(4 continued): In our cases, the concept of multi-organizational fields can be brought in to

analyze the cohesiveness and effectiveness of civil society pertaining to the protests.
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also like the capacity of authorities to present a solid front to insurgents – that
discourage contention” (Ibid, 20). Briefly, Tarrow enumerates the general
opportunity changes he finds most important: 1) Increased political access, mostly by
means of elections – 2) deepening divisions among elites, – 3) political realignments
strengthening the protest movement– 4) influential elite groups defect to protesters’
camp – and 5) repression is moderate or inconsistent (Ibid, 77-80). However, he
admonishes that these are contingent dimensions, and that other dimensions may be
more relevant in other empirical cases than his own. Opportunity changes may occur
either before or simultaneously with the protest cycle, but Tarrow’s model also brings
in more stable aspects of opportunity-constraints: State strength and repression (Ibid.
81).
Our empirical study will endeavor to ascertain whether Tarrow’s political
opportunities for contention actually did open in Tunisia and Morocco before
protests erupted, or whether other political opportunities or constraints must be
identified. Alternatively, contention flared up under a stable authoritarian system. In
the case of Tunisia, the latter narrative has been presented in most media and early
analyses of the events. Kuran (1991) illustrates that when collective action does
break out under depressed conditions of organization, “(...) it turns from a trickle into
a torrent as people learn for the first time that others like themselves have taken to
the streets.” This is reminiscent of the cycle of contention in Tunisia, as we shall see.
A preliminary reading on Morocco, on the other hand, seems to indicate that political
opportunities had indeed opened there throughout the decade of King Mohamed VI’s
rule, and that the state had become much more tolerant of protests. The question
remains to what extent the most recent wave of contention represents a qualitatively
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new phenomenon also in Morocco.

II.2.1 Consensus as the groundwork for collective action

Shared action frames and identities may arguably empower restive, repressed
societies in relation to their authoritarian masters. For this process to take root,
however, I need a more specific model of how collective action frames are generated.
Gamson (1995, 89-90), a prominent theorist of collective action, identifies three key
factors that must be present for a consensus to become a plausible platform for such
action:
•

The injustice factor is usually defined as outrage over the way the
government is treating a social problem, most often originating from a feeling
of illegitimate inequality or a feeling that key moral principles are being
violated (see Klandermans 1997, 38). Gamson highlights the emotional side
of injustice, and its potential as a driving force for participation (1995, 8991). Strong media images might often produce compelling emotional
reactions of this kind. Melucci mentions that mobilization cannot simply be
reduced to a cost-benefit calculation, because adherents have to be
emotionally attached to their cause (1995, 45; see also McAdam 1982, 51).

•

The shared identity aspect, which Melucci described as indispensable (1995,
44-47; Klandermans 1997, 41). Shared identity is a ubiquitous phenomenon,
but is only politically relevant if one is able to define a concrete “us” in
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opposition to a clearly defined target for protest, “them”, which could be the
government, for instance. The inverse is also true: If the target of a grievance
is too abstract or too diffuse, or not known, people will not move (Gamson
1995, 90).

•

The agency dimension - People need to believe that something “can be done”
about an issue. A dissemination of the belief that collective action can be
successful is related to a perceived opening of political opportunities
(Klandermans 1997, 42). Under authoritarian conditions, agency will often be
hindered by passivity and fear. State media will echo the regime’s discourse
of quietism, law and order, and portray mobilization as a dramatic breach of
social stability (Gamson 1995, 96). However, when there are media images of
successful action readily available, people find it easier to join a cause and
identify the target (Ibid, 104). Gamson concludes that agency should be
treated as a “dormant characteristic” in human beings, and as something one
should try to awaken (Ibid, 106).
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II.2.2 Media resources for collective action frame generation

The aforementioned dimensions beg a study of how media resources could be
used by activists during the uprisings in the Arab world in the spring of 2011. Both
Klandermans (1997) and Gamson (1995) are quick to highlight the role of the media
in disseminating certain discourses and generating action frames. The introduction of
the Internet to the Middle East has been the most momentous step towards a
fundamental media transformation in the region, which has enabled an
unprecedented potential for connectivity, notably through new social media
(Abdullah 2010, 70-75). The region was previously known for its low scores on all
indices of globalization. Kamrava (2007, 204) posits that Middle Eastern regimes
have shown little interest in increasing transparency, opening information flows and
easing restrictions on civil society – prerequisites of globalization which would
threaten the regimes. However, new communication technologies have slowly
become available to at least strata from the middle-classes upwards.
Cottle (2011, 648) argues that these new media have been fused directly into
political processes within the recent Arab uprisings. In societies where there are no
real ways of political claims-making outside the regime, social media create a new,
highly inclusive, and informal space for exchanging opinions and engaging in
politics (Dahlgren 2009, cited in Cottle 2011). Online, new identities can be created,
shared, and transformed, and new interests and demands identified by a large number
of individuals. Such live communication helps to embolden formerly passive
individuals, for instance by appealing to the emotional aspect Gamson (1995) noted.
Aspects of collective identity, and a sense of who the “enemy” is, can clearly be built
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and sustained online, and images of protests and of successful regime changes in
other countries nourishes the agency aspect for increasing numbers of individuals
(Cottle 2011, 654). At the same time, regimes have not hesitated to set strict controls
on online content (Ibid. 653). Bloggers and activists have been harassed and arrested,
and their pages shut down, e.g. in Tunisia. Nevertheless, a challenge for regimes has
been the basic fact that cyberspace is not confined to actual geography: Leading
online militants are often located abroad, or in unknown locations, as an “offshore”
democratizing force.
The use of media and Internet also draws attention to the transnational impact
of the ongoing events in the Maghreb: The revolution in Tunisia has undoubtedly had
direct bearing on the occurrence of unrest in the rest of the Middle East over the last
months. Tarrow can remind us that as long as the target of contention is the domestic
regime, contention itself is not transnational – but ideas about contention, and the
prospect of successful regime change, amount to a transnational diffusion of ideas
and agency which alter calculations of opportunity and threat in similar settings
(1998, 185).
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II.2.4 Synthesis of the Conceptual Framework and hypotheses

To sum up the theoretical works above, I will suggest dependent and
independent variables which must be examined and compared and the tentative
relationship between them presented as a set of hypotheses. Our dependent concept
is degrees of contention, and under this label I will examine the speed and size of
demonstrations (action mobilization) and the “radicalism” (revolutionary or
reformist) of protesters' demands. As indicated earlier, the dependent variable is not
regime change per se, although it is natural to touch on this in the Tunisian case. The
state's response to contention constitutes an integral part of the conditions for protest.
From the general theories and preliminary readings reviewed above, one might
suggest the following independent variables:
• Extent and impact of economic liberalization, also within cases across time
(the last three decades).
• Extent and impact of political liberalization, also within cases across time (the
last three decades).
• Legitimacy of the regime/perception of injustice
• Strength and cohesiveness of civil society
• Access to Internet and media resources
• Literacy and education levels
• Extent of consensus mobilization
• Perception of agency
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These variables are all qualitative phenomena, so again one must be
reminded that they are not necessarily discrete, exhaustive or possible to gauge
with precision. Especially the importance of perceptions is difficult to assess. The
purpose of this study is precisely to explore recent events with the ambition of
detecting new factors and relationships. Thirdly, these factors do not correspond
or pair up neatly with the dependent variables; rather, they impinge on each other
and might function as intervening variables etc. in a system which cannot be fully
defined and extricated here.
Based on these theoretical tools and preliminary insights I present the
following general model of contentious politics in Tunisia and Morocco,
containing four sub-hypotheses:

1. The “authoritarian bargain” is undermined as regimes renew their hold on
power in different ways, while socio-economic and demographic changes
affect increasing numbers of Tunisians and Moroccans negatively.
2. People use communication technologies to disseminate a consensus about
grievances and injustice.
3. A triggering event sparks protests, which echo widely because of the widely
shared sense of grievances – the pre-existing consensus. The intensity of
grievances affects the intensity of protests.
4. The transnational diffusion of ideas becomes the “spark” in neighboring
countries, and the cycle of contention spreads across borders.

34

III – Socio-economic Changes and Authoritarian
Stagnation

III.1 Economic crises and structural adjustment

Our two cases, Tunisia and Morocco, both engaged in economic reforms and
structural adjustment in the 1980s. These countries felt the disadvantages of their
previous statist economic policies quite early: Tunisia effectively pioneered the
Infitah reform package (which is better known from Egypt (Richards and Waterbury
2008, 239)) in the early 1970s, and Morocco followed suit with timid attempts at
stabilization in 1977 (Ibid, 243). However, changes were restricted to improving the
already state-dominated economy, with the government still in control of prices,
credits and foreign exchange.
Neither country was able to prevent the misallocation of resources due to
state control over the economy, and both wanted to avoid reneging on promises about
salary rises in the public sector and further growth in investments intended to create
jobs. Being politically paralyzed, both the Moroccan and the Tunisian governments
believed they could “grow through” the compounded shocks of falling oil and
phosphate prices, international economic recession in the early 1980s, rising interest
rates on international loans, drought, and, for Morocco, the costs of the war in
Western Sahara (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 240, 243; Layachi 1998b, 57). This
unwarranted optimism enticed both regimes to continue to borrow heavily from
abroad, resulting in severe balance-of-payments crises.
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Morocco, one of the most vulnerable economies in North Africa, had to bow
to the pressure and accept structural adjustment in 1983. Tunisia followed suit in
August 1986, after having proudly resisted for a long time (Richards and Waterbury
2008, 240). The leadership of aging Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba had become
more and more erratic, and the coup d’état of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on November
7, 1987 was partly driven by the need for a predictable, pragmatic course in the
country’s economic policy. Thence, Ben Ali was committed to reforms, as was King
Hassan II in Morocco.
The adjustment packages they signed on to included classical measures such
as devaluating currencies, promoting exports, reducing tariffs and import protection,
deregulating the banking sector, raising real interest rates, privatization, and reducing
budget deficits (Beau and Tuquoi 1999, 147). Typically, the IMF and the World Bank
wanted governments to have deficits no higher than 4% of GDP (Ibid, 220; Layachi
1998b 58-60). Subsidies were to be removed or reduced to a minimum (Perkins
2004, 170).
Unlike most other Middle Eastern and North African countries, Morocco and
Tunisia were seen as very compliant with IMF conditionality. Both followed a
conservative budgetary policy in the end of the 1980s, with Moroccan budget deficits
falling to around 2% of GDP in the early 1990s (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 244).
In both countries, real interest rates were positive and inflation reduced to a
manageable 2-3%, in line with international recommendations. The World Bank
praised Morocco for its impressive results in 1992, and Ben Ali’s technocratic
government has also cooperated closely with the international financial institutions in
implementing macro-economic orthodoxy (Ibid, 239, 244). From 1987-1992, private
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investment grew to 51% of the total, and by 1997 foreign investment in Tunisia was
at $500 million (Alexander 2010, 81). GDP growth also accelerated in both
countries: For the period 1987-1992 it rose from 2.8% to 4.3% in Tunisia, and it
stabilized at around 4% in Morocco (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 240). Later,
Moroccan growth has been sluggish however, hovering around 2-3 percent for most
of the 1990s and early 2000s (Ibid, 245).
Both countries persisted on continuing their reforms throughout the same
decades. As the macro-economic indicators have come under control, the focus has
shifted to the more challenging task of dealing with deregulation, rationalizing the
public sector, increasing revenue, and finalizing institutional reforms. Fiscal
measures were streamlined to favor investment rather than consumption, and efforts
were made to ensure that private investors could obtain unfettered profits from their
projects (Pfeifer 1999, 24).
In order to achieve the structural goals, Morocco and Tunisia also wanted to
adhere to free-trade arrangements (Alexander 2010, 82; Bertelsmann Stiftung Online
2006). Morocco became associated with the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1987, and Tunisia followed suit in 1990. Especially important were
the comprehensive free trade agreements Tunisia and Morocco negotiated with the
European Union, their main trading partner, in 1995 and 1996 respectively. The two
countries were the first on the Mediterranean’s southern shore to be granted this
privileged access to European markets and money (Alexander 2010, 84; Pfeifer
1999, 25). These free trade agreements were only politically acceptable because the
transitional phases were long; it was envisaged that the removal of Tunisian tariffs
would take place incrementally over 12 years, with full implementation in 2008
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(Murphy 1999, 148). Moroccan non-tariff protection measures remained high until
well into the early 2000s. In 2006 the World Bank conceded that “the degree of
import protection left Morocco with a not very open economy” (2006a, 99). This
entailed that leading political and economic actors in Morocco continue to seek rent
as well.
Tunisia has maybe been more successful at economic integration. In 1996, the
European Union (EU) entered a ten year-agreement with the Ben Ali regime to
upgrade Tunisian businesses and ameliorate both the quality of products and
efficiency of production – the so-called mise à niveau-program (Alexander 2010,
83). This support was coupled with further loans from international and bilateral
lenders – in 2005, Tunisia had a new debt of $19.2 billion, a large amount for an
economy of its size (Ibid.).
Important challenges remained, and Richards and Waterbury highlight that
the overall scorecard on reform is mixed for both countries (2008, 24, 245).
Reducing budget deficits was not done by increasing revenue collection or widening
tax collection, but by slashing public consumption and subsidies, and capping
salaries and employment figures in the public sector. Both countries achieved great
short-term income from privatization, but such revenue must be reinvested to add
value. In most cases, this did not happen (Denoueux 2001, 75).
Privatization stagnated for a long time for political reasons in both countries –
regimes preferred to preserve existing jobs and add new ones, albeit redundant, to
stem the tide of unemployment (King 1994, 117). Tunisia started privatizing more
strategic sectors over the last decade, but as we shall see, this process was not
transparent. The same was the case in Morocco; when privatization of state
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enterprises finally took place, allegations ensued that the sales benefited the
politically well connected (Sater 2010, 103; interview with Younes M’Jahid,
President of the Moroccan Journalists’ Union 2011). Second, trade unions have
resisted privatization ferociously, strikes and protests have slowed down productivity,
and investors have often been reluctant to salvage these companies (Richards and
Waterbury 2008, 245).
Beyond the agreements and macro-economic policies enumerated here, the
institutional reforms associated with economic liberalization have been limited in
both countries. Although evaluations by the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have
been full of praise, and the macro-indicators point in the desired direction, critics
such as Hibou (2011) find that populism, clientelism, and statist interventions are
still abundant. Under new economic conditions the special relationships between the
state and key constituencies have been renegotiated and relabeled: Crucially, regimes
are now closely tied to small private business elites in each country, private
businesses have been sold to regime members, and we shall see that this new
entanglement has damaged their legitimacy considerably.
On the other hand subsidies, cheap access to credit, and other populist
measures to the middle classes were never cut entirely. Corporatism has been
dismantled in a piecemeal fashion, especially in Tunisia where Ben Ali's regime was
always compared to Bourguiba's. Tunisians expected education and services to be
maintained. However, perceived inequalities grew as a result of the reforms, and
especially the bulging cohorts of youth felt excluded from economic life. The same
problem affected Morocco, but there a larger segment of the population had never
been integrated into the statist economy, and they expected less from the authorities.
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III.2 Unemployment and the challenge of educational reform

It is interesting to note that Morocco has been much less successful than
Tunisia at developing its human capital. While Tunisia performed best in the region,
with the highest enrollment ratios in secondary and higher education, Morocco’s
ratios are only one third of Tunisia’s, and the former was ranked as one of the worst
in the MENA region (Harmak 2008, cited in Boukhars 2011, 34). This is a crucial
contrast to include in our further discussion of the difference between consensus
mobilization and protests in Tunisia and Morocco. Illiteracy levels in Morocco are
high among a population that is still relatively poor and rural, and the education
system is old-fashioned. The result is an educational system which also produces
graduates with degrees the economy does not need – there is a disconnect between
the labor market and the educational system that has tremendous social consequences
(Boukhars 2011, 31; Richards and Waterbury 2008, 119).
The situation in Tunisia was also problematic. Murphy (1999, 157-163)
claims that education had spiraled into crisis already in the 1990s. Among other
problems, it had become gradually more important for students and parents to
nurture good connections with the ruling party Rassemblement Constitutionnel
Démocratique (RCD) to secure access to stipends, elite schools, and sometimes even
high grades (Ibid.). In short, regime reforms and privatization had contributed to
aggravating social disparities within the education system.
When Tunisian students graduated, they also found an economy that could
not absorb them. Even though Tunisia has marketed itself as a host country for
advanced industries, most of the economic expansion has taken place in traditional
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sectors and tourism, and there has been little demand for graduates – only 7.4% of
those hired by manufacturing actually have higher education (Haddar 2010, 66).
Similar structural problems are apparent in Morocco, where as many as 45%
of new graduates are unemployed (Boukhars 2011). In certain urban areas such as
Casablanca the numbers may reach 70%, (in 2002, USAID estimated that total
unemployment was 20%, and urban unemployment 36%, and levels increase with
levels of education, and among women (cited in Boukhars 2011).
Even before the uprisings of the Arab spring, authors labeled the
unemployment problem a major potential source of political instability. And the
ripples on the surface were already showing; in Morocco, organized unemployed
graduates stormed the headquarters of the Istiqlal party in Casablanca in 2007
because they were required to take another competitive exam to get jobs. In Rabat,
daily sit-ins demanding the “Right to Work” have been held for years. The
government has dealt with the problem in its own piece-meal, patronizing manner:
1000 graduates were given jobs in 2007, on the condition that they refrained from
militancy in the streets (Badimon-Emperador 2007: 5). Similarly, the King and his
technocrats have taken responsibility for highly publicized job-generating
development projects, reinstating a new form of royal populism in the process
(Boukhars 2011, 36). One must consider that the Monarchy has been able to follow
this strategy because unemployed graduates, though an articulate group in Morocco,
are relatively fewer than in more developed Tunisia. The variations in the numbers of
graduates correspond with the disparities in education levels and the size of the
middle classes, where Tunisia has a larger middle educated class than Morocco. All
these factors in turn impinge levels of mobilization, as we shall see.
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III.3 The rhetoric of reform and the reality of authoritarian
renewal

Both Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hassan II in Morocco adopted a language of
political reform while steering the course of economic adjustment. Ben Ali had to
legitimize his rule in new ways, because Bourguiba’s authoritarian bargain had come
under threat. The result was the National Pact of 1988, where civil society and
opposition parties were included (Murphy 1999, 174). The pact was intended to
embody a new consensus around liberal values, but the specific promises were few.
Interestingly, the pact expressed a commitment by the government to honor
human rights and civil and political freedoms (Ibid, 175). The “Tunisian Spring” was
short-lived, however; Ben Ali used the Islamist threat from the Al-Nahda
(“Renaissance”) Movement as a pretext for building a new security state, and for
curbing these liberties in practice in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ibid, 202). As
the years went by, it was apparent to everyone that Ben Ali’s rhetoric concerning
constitutional safeguards and liberal democracy had only been window-dressing in a
transitional phase (Alexander 2010, 54, 62-66).
Notably, the Ben Ali regime has manipulated electoral rules before every
election; for example, by setting aside a few seats to opposition parties while at the
same time making the latter irrelevant in the larger political context. The secular
opposition has never had a chance to grow and reach out to the electorate, so it
grudgingly accepted this form of co-optation in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. At most,
these arrangements at the mercy of the executive granted the opposition a 25% share
of the 212 seats in the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Ibid). Secondly, parties were
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encouraged to compete over these few seats, and the ensuing “divide-and-rule”
arrangement benefited only the hegemonic RCD (Alexander 2010, 62-66).
In Morocco, the reassertion of authoritarianism has occurred in more subtle
ways, and therefore deserves a more detailed treatise here. Since the 1990s, it has
become clear that the regime tolerates the emergence of civil society, and that
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of association and freedom of expression
have been gradually accommodated both in law and practice (Layachi 1998, 69-73).
Another noteworthy development has been the easing of repression – King Hassan II
set free political prisoners at the end of his reign, and Mohamed VI has
acknowledged the human rights abuses that happened during the années de plomb in
the 1960s and 1970s. In this regard, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set
up already in King Hassan’s days to investigate human rights abuses (Storm 2007).
This is a very notable difference from the Tunisian context.
Opposition groups were allowed to form and work in Morocco, civil society
expanded, and elections have been held regularly since the 1990s (1993, 1997, 2002,
2007) - all to ease the pressures ensuing from economic transformation, population
growth, rural-urban migration, unemployment, and other crises which compounded
each other.
Morocco’s political party system has roots from decades back, and is
composed of a wide specter of groups and coalitions. Analysts are quick to
emphasize the shortcomings of this party landscape. First of all, many political
parties have been set up by the Makhzen itself, and represent only the interests of the
regime and the administration (Layachi 1998, 100). Secondly, all parties can be
evaluated as organizationally weak and missing active constituencies that they can
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mobilize to create any real counterweight to the executive or to each other (Boukhars
2011, 61). Parties are based on corporatist loyalties and personal connections.
There is also a very problematic disconnect between the parties and their
political platforms: Ideology plays no role when electoral alliances and coalitions are
negotiated, something that confuses voters. Indeed, the liberalization of the party
system was a slow process led “top-down” by the Monarchy, and the parties are still
deferential to the Palace (Sater 2010, 83).
Boukhars claims that the King does not hesitate to exercise his powers. There
are many anecdotes about him overturning ministerial recommendations, or issuing
Dahirs (decrees) concerning key civil servant appointments, etc. on which the
Ministers are not consulted. The same applies to new political initiatives, which
originate rather with the King and his close advisors than with party politicians.
Under Hassan II, the government functioned as a committee, the role of which was to
implement projects emanating from the King, his private coterie of technocratic
advisors, and the Makhzen. This purely managerial role has continued under
Mohamed VI, even though he claims that his role only complements that of the
Council of Ministers (Sater 2010, 83).
The secluded group of royal councilors effectively constitutes a shadow
government that has much more influence than the official government. Mohamed
VI has recruited many of the best technocrats and administrators in the country to his
councils, and these people have often produced viable and forward-looking plans for
further economic and administrative reforms and improvements. The problem
remains, of course, that this group is completely exempt from any public
accountability or scrutiny, and that decision-making procedures are opaque
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(Boukhars 2011, 51-53).
Furthermore, these technocratic elites, which now head all major government
institutions, have been co-opted by the Makhzen, and if they ever advocated any
systemic changes, they almost always acquiesce after having been offered
administrative influence, prestigious jobs, and high salaries (Sater 2010, 75). In some
ways, then, the technocratic apparatus around King Mohamed VI resembles the
administration that surrounded Ben Ali in the 1990s – the latter was seen as
surrounding himself with a circle of managers who could implement reforms while
being shielded from criticism. In addition, Ben Ali prevented any technocrats from
emerging as leading personalities of their own, and he constantly shuffled them from
position to position in order to ensure that they did not build their own patronage
networks or constituencies (Murphy 1999, 217-218).
This was a contrast to his predecessor Habib Bourguiba, who had enjoyed
being an arbiter among competing interests and networks – an open “game of divideand-rule” was surely Bourguiba’s leadership style (Ibid). Bourguiba was an expert at
people management (Alexander 2010, 115), while Ben Ali ruled by means of a
centralized, insulated technocracy (Ibid). Perhaps the Moroccan King has been able
to do some of both - he also enjoys a role as “supreme arbiter” among competing
factions and interests, which he keeps tied to him at the same time (Sater 2010, 8586). In Tunisia, Ben Ali's increasingly insular regime lost some of its alliances with
key interests, meaning that it also lost legitimacy over time.
The Moroccan Parliamentary system I mentioned above is an example of
Monarchic influence over the polity. The Parliament provides an arena for competing
interests, but the King retains ultimate decision-making prerogatives (Zerhouni 2008,
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219-220). Parties are kept weak because they fight each other, while the Assembly
mostly serves as a “rubber stamp” to approve initiatives from the Palace without
debate. Moroccans call it a Chambre d’enregistrement, which derogatorily means
that it only makes records of, and adds legitimacy to, the King’s wishes (Boukhars
2011, 44, 74). A de-legitimization of Parliament and elected politicians has only
served the Makhzen, and underpinned the Monarch’s popularity (Zerhouni 2008,
217- 219).
One case where the Makhzen might have seen its power curtailed was under
the gouvernement d'alternance of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi from
1998 onwards. Youssoufi had been a long-standing opponent of King Hassan, and
the latter appointed him to attenuate the authoritarian image of his regime. However,
Youssoufi's power was still severely restricted by Royal prerogatives, and he had to
rely on political forces straddling the political landscape to secure a coalition. In
other words, this effort to “bring the Leftists to power” was unable to break with the
democratically deficient system of the past, and King Mohamed appointed several
technocratic Prime Ministers during the early 2000s, limiting the political legacy of
alternance (Ibid.).
The main difference from Tunisia's short-lived liberalization was still that the
Moroccan Monarchy had renegotiated its relationship with key constituencies in a
subtle way, and without reverting to repression. This capacity to adhere to a reformist
discourse might have shored up the King's legitimacy among important groups, while
Ben Ali on his part was increasingly seen as aloof and corrupt.
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III.4 The worsening Problem of Corruption

Of course, corruption has been an endemic problem both in Tunisia and
Morocco at all levels of society. In Morocco, corruption has been a widespread
problem throughout, and Transparency International (TI) saw Morocco dip on its
global rankings from 45th place in 1999 to 80th in 2008 (Boukhars 2011, 26). A large
majority of Moroccans acknowledge that corruption is deeply embedded into the
workings of public institutions, and they find the government’s efforts against it to be
completely ineffectual (Ibid, 27). Some will even concede that they do not think
corruption is dysfunctional – it is just the way the Moroccan system “works” (Hibou
and Tozy 2000).
According to TI again, Morocco is one of the hardest hit countries (if not the
worst) in the entire Arab World. In 2007, the Cour des Comptes (Audit Court)
published a much-publicized report indicting the country’s governance and
corruption culture. It listed the paying of bribes, the recruitment of personnel based
on connections rather than competence, waste of public funds, absenteeism among
public officials, political and bureaucratic corruption, and clientelism of all sorts. The
report, produced by 200 magistrates under the King’s control, testifies to the
importance the King seemingly assigns to dealing with this dysfunctional
administrative culture (Ibid, 26; Sater 2010, 80).
Acknowledging these problems might fuel sympathy towards the King’s
reform-oriented rhetoric and enshrine his image as a paternalistic leader that wants
the best for his country. This is in contrast to Ben Ali, who was viewed as enriching
himself personally at the people’s expense (Beau and Tuquoi 1999). However, in the
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Moroccan case one must also ask whether the Makhzen, the parties, and other key
groups have an actual will or even ability to combat corruption. Mechanisms of
patronage are assuredly at the very core of how the Makhzen runs the country.
Privatization and deregulation of economic life has not helped, with well-positioned
businessmen and regime figures being able to reap company shares at low prices, and
securing access to new licenses, privileged access to credit, etc. (Sater 2010, 103;
Younes M’Jahid, interview 2011).
In Tunisia, the stories about corruption multiplied over the years. Especially
French works dig into the successive scandals in which the Ben Ali regime was
implicated (Lamloum and Ravenel 2002, Beau and Tuquoi 1999, Beau and Graciet
2009). The Neo-Destour party, and its successor the RCD, had always been
clientelistic structures gravitating around the President and tying various
constituencies and regions to his regime. In fact, some observers advance the
contested notion that Ben Ali had merely recreated former President Habib
Bourguiba’s populist system.
Observers also notice that the Tunisian authoritarian system has always been
more populist than corporatist, meaning that the RCD, trade unions, and other key
organizations were never intended to represent corporatist interests “upwards” in any
way, but just to channel patronage and commands from the “top down” (Alexander
2010, 113; Interview with Mamdouh, NGO chairman, 2011 5). Even though this
conclusion is probably too categorical, Ben Ali’s populist ideology gradually became
more and more pervasive. Since the days of the National Pact in 1988, the Ben Ali
regime had underlined the importance of a national consensus benefiting the entire
5 The real names of my interviewees have been kept confidential for safety reasons, except in a few
cases where respondents explicitly gave informed consent to me using their true identity.

48

social body, and this notion became one of several tools to tie people to the
paternalistic figure of the President. Additionally, incrementalism and a political
culture of moderation were portrayed as the “Tunisian way”, thus restricting the
public space for legitimate contention or pluralistic politics (Hibou 2011, 60).
The President, just like the Moroccan King, launched social development
funds that were under his personal control 6. While the money doled out to
orphanages, schools, women’s leagues, et cetera as part of Ben Ali's mass politics
was appreciated by large numbers of Tunisians, people realized that Ben Ali's state
distributed less than what the previous regime had done before liberal reforms began.
But most importantly, stories of corruption within Ben Ali’s inner circle proliferated
and punched holes in the official discourse about a “welfare state” in Tunisia. While
the RCD party and the corporatist system came under pressure from a banal
populism, the informal circle of families around Ben Ali was monopolizing political
and economic power.
This clique was popularly called “Les Trabelsi”, even though they included
more people than just the family of Leila Trabelsi, Ben Ali’s wife. She became a
symbol of the regime’s greed, however, and at the end her family’s reputation was
damaged beyond repair. Notably, the families were implicated in cases of outright
theft, smuggling, and money laundering, which awarded them the nickname of
“mafias” (Reem, Ahmed, Saida, interviews 2011; Kirkpatrick 2011).
The liberalization of the economy was one process they managed to
manipulate: Few companies were privatized in Tunisia without someone from the
“clans” obtaining inside access to shares in profitable ventures, or to lucrative
6 The fund known as the Fonds de solidarité Nationale was especially notorious. It was set up by
the president himself and operated with no form of financial oversight (Hibou 2011, 194).
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commercial licenses, or even key corporate board positions (Beau and Graciet 2009).
Banks, infrastructure, and media were privatized in turn, always under a veil of neoliberal rhetoric which foreign donors and observers tended to accept at face value,
but with assets de facto still controlled by a family that did not distinguish between
their private finances and those of the state (Nawaat Online 2010, 34). And,
Tunisians were aware of this – already in 1997, a secret anonymous tract had
circulated in Tunis denouncing “tentacular corruption” (Sadiki 2002, 68). To a larger
extent than in Morocco, economic wealth was assembled on a few hands, and the gap
between the very rich and the increasingly poor became more and more blatant.
Regardless of how pervasive the manipulation of the economic sphere in
Tunisia actually was, investors became gradually more reluctant to participate in new
projects because the ruling families were incessantly extorting concessions and side
payments, and because the overall investment climate turned more and more
politicized (Haddar 2010, 64). In economic terms then, the authoritarian bargain was
replaced by a parasitic system in Tunisia. The authoritarian bargain was of course
never an even deal, but most people had accepted economic security in return for
loyalty since Bourguiba’s days. Crucially, one observes that Ben Ali lost important
alliances with the business elites and upper classes, and that he based his rule on a
gradually narrower group of close individuals. This isolation was not balanced out by
Ben Ali's token charitable activities, and the fact that his closes aides were widely
resented by the people hurt his position even further.
At times Ben Ali leaned towards mitigating some of the negative effects of
his own neo-liberal reforms. Hibou (2011, 182) argues that Ben Ali’s regime
functioned as a “security pact” more than a bargain – the pact was issued and
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enforced unilaterally by the regime over society. The security pact entailed that the
state would protect the people against all dangers, be they political or social. It was
first of all intended to stem the rise of Islamism, which had become the ultimate
rationale for developing the security state. And the security forces grew
exponentially during Ben Ali’s term, as did their surveillance powers (Hamadouche
and Zabir 2007, 268). Commentators described the whole country as one big
Commissariat de Police (Sadiki 2002, 68). In fact, the country had as many police
officers as France, a country with six times its population (Schraeder and Derissi
2011, 6).
While the Ben Ali regime and its ruling families were privatizing the
economic sphere, they were also viewed as “privatizing the state,” (Hibou 2006, 196;
Mamdouh, interview 2011) this did not just mean a delegation of regulatory or
administrative functions. Increasingly, the traditional administrative hierarchy was
supplanted by an informal, personal structure embedded within pre-existing
institutions and RCD party cells. In ways reminding us of the Moroccan Makhzen, a
new clientelist network emanated from the ruling family clique, with agents placed
all over the official administrative apparatus. This shadowy structure equaled a “state
within a state”, and arguably included a private police, a “private justice system”,
and private intelligence agencies at the exclusive disposal of the inner circles of Ben
Ali. Unlike the neo-Makhzenian institutions of Mohamed VI, Ben Ali’s private
apparatus did not have a recognized existence and public purpose, which could have
assigned them at least a slight degree of legitimacy. Additionally, even though this
parallel structure was probably intended to pre-empt any challenges and
counterbalance a lack of support outside it, it is obvious in retrospect that it was not
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solid enough to repress the unexpected popular wave of January 2011.
If Ben Ali's “shadow state” turned him into an arbiter between various group
interests and patronage networks, he did not succeed in handling this role as well as
the Moroccan Kings usually have. They are more accustomed to facing a pluralistic
configuration of economic interests, regional groupings, social classes, and
bureaucratic and political circles. Indeed, the late King Hassan II was seen as a
master of this kind of rule – he shielded the Moroccan Army from civilian meddling,
protected his clients in the traditional Moroccan bourgeoisie, patronized the country’s
small Jewish community, etc. (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 312-313). Even though
the arbitrage itself was not always successful, this political dynamic ensured that the
King remained the keystone in this structure. Mohamed VI continues to enjoy the
same role today (Boukhars 2011, 54).
The problems of corruption in Tunisia and Morocco were markedly different,
and it will be interesting to see how these differences informed the intensity of
grievances and degrees of discontent. In Morocco, corruption was broadly seen as a
grave but rather diffuse societal malaise. Corruption is thought of as commonplace at
all levels, and people tend to blame highly visible senior politicians and officials.
Nonetheless, the Monarch himself is rarely accused of direct implication in it, and
accusations against him gain limited popular support. Thus, the King's popularity and
prestige have been more shielded than that of the Tunisian President. Not only did
Ben Ali not draw upon the same traditional authority as the King – people quickly
associated him personally, and the people around him, with an unscrupulous and
targeted exploitation of public assets. It is clear that allegations of corruption
dramatically undermined Ben Ali's popular support.
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III.5 Limitations on civil society in Tunisia and Morocco

We have seen how both Ben Ali and the Moroccan Kings proudly embraced
liberal reforms that – in theory – granted an increased role to political parties, and
maneuvering space to the opposition. This rhetoric was also embracing one of the
fundamental pillars of political liberalization: The emancipation of organized civil
society. Especially Morocco reveled in being labeled “a liberal Arab state”
(Maghraoui 2008, 198).
Tunisia’s relapse into authoritarianism in the early 1990s was obvious. Media
rights were constricted after a few years, and experts found evidence of human rights
abuses. The regime clearly found human rights activists to be a nuisance, and
promulgated a new Law of Associations in 1992. This law exposed civil society to
infiltration by state agents, and restricted its activities (Murphy 1999, 206). The law
succeeded in stymying much of the autonomous associational movement in Tunisia.
Ben Ali continued to embrace a human rights discourse, but activists were
increasingly being harassed, arrested, and targeted in other ways (Ibid. 202, 207;
Sadiki 2002, 69-71). The Political Police and plain-clothed agents from various
Mukhabarat agencies broke into activists’ homes, tapped their telephones,
confiscated their passports and strove to exclude them from normal social life in as
many was as possible (Hibou 2006, 188-189). For instance, the Tunisian Human
Rights Association Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de L’Homme
(LTDH) held its last Congress in 1994, because persecution of its members had
become so preponderant.
The majority of journalists have also reverted to auto-censorship in order to
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avoid any friction with the authorities. This was not only the case for state-owned
media corporations; private Tunisian media were also confined within a system of
political interests and ownership structures that conditioned any editorial policies
(Sadiki 2002, 71; Marwa, interview 2011). Self-censorship is a familiar feature in the
Moroccan media landscape as well (Younes M’Jahid, interview 2011).
The Ben Ali regime, on its side, continued to display its organizations, and
boasted that Tunisia had almost 10,000 registered NGOs in the last years before
2011. These were mostly sports clubs, youth associations, women’s leagues and other
non-politicized organizations, and they remained, in fact, tightly controlled and
monitored by the RCD and the state. These associations served a variety of purposes
for the regime: They disseminated regime discourse on key issues such as women’s
rights, children’s rights, economic development, and so on, and in reality they
glorified Ben Ali and his initiatives (Hibou 2011, 96-98). Moreover, associations
were useful tools for surveillance of any active individuals. This is demonstrated by
the state’s efforts to keep accurate databases on associations and their membership.
Finally, the state saw civil society as a useful intermediary to ensure that its programs
of economic liberalization and rationalization progressed, maybe with civil society
replacing some of the service provisions of a “retreating state” (Ibid.).
The organizations which continued to defend their autonomy, and which
dared being critical of the regime, were exceedingly few: The LDTH, the Conseil
National des Libertés de la Tunisie (CNLT), the Bar Association, the Journalists’
Syndicate and the independent Magistrates were all quite marginal. The trade union
federation Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) was a different story: It
has always been the single most important organization in Tunisian public life, and it
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has maintained financial autonomy. Politically, however, the UGTT has always kept
an ambiguous relationship with the regime. The trade union federation is too
important for the regime to ignore or antagonize, but Ben Ali and the RCD have
striven to co-opt and control it as much as possible, or to undermine it indirectly with
a discourse of liberal reforms, privatization, and conformity with the demands of
global competitiveness (Cavallo 1998, 242-246).
According to Hibou (2011, 124), the Ben Ali regime had mostly succeeded at
this effort, at least at the central level of the organization. Direct conflicts between
the trade union and the RCD became rarer over the years, and the UGTT was seen as
another machine implementing the President’s policies, and working to ensure social
peace. In return for the acquiescence of rank-and-file workers, cadres were enmeshed
in the patronage networks of the regime (Ibid.). I shall return to why this assessment
of the UGTT was fundamentally misinformed.
The conclusion is that Ben Ali’s Tunisia had a very marginal civil society,
which was seemingly incapacitated from representing particular interests, advocating
any rights and political liberties, or addressing social, economic and political issues
with autonomy. This seems in contrast to Morocco, where civil society has been
portrayed as much more vibrant since the 1990s.
In fact, Hassan II and Mohamed VI understood that civil society could act as
a safety valve for societal pressures, and Moroccan society has also witnessed a
proliferation of NGOs working on local development projects, charitable assistance
to housing, advocating women’s rights and education, promoting improved care for
children, advocating recognition of Amazigh (Berber) cultural rights and a host of
other domains. Albeit, a vast majority of these associations are either charitable and
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depoliticized, or working within the confines of regime approval just like in Ben
Ali’s Tunisia (Maghraoui 1998, 198; Layachi 1998, 97-98).
Many NGOs have been set up by regime actors, and are not autonomous.
Rather, the Makhzen uses these NGOs to renew its own image, conform to an
international liberal agenda, and appropriate funds from international donors (Sater
2007, 22). In the same vein, Moroccans typically perceive the secular and liberal
NGOs as an elite project, and the poor prefer to revert to Islamic foundations for
livelihood support (Ibid, 23). Formally accredited NGOs have also been set up by
members of the professional classes or the new socioeconomic groups that have
emerged in the wake of economic reforms, but who have felt left out from traditional
Makhzen networks. These new organizations have therefore not prioritized reaching
out and becoming mass movements, at least not until 2011 (Ibid, 23, 91).
Denoueux and Gateau (1995) argue further that the emergence of civil society
in Morocco was an attempt by the Makhzen to pre-empt any uncontrollable
challenges in the public domain. Slowly, public debate has been opened up and new
issues can now be broached, but the modes of contestation and action are still strictly
limited. Certainly, regime agents monitor the sector closely, and in particular those
organizations that refuse co-optation. Some organizations that have been perceived
as detrimental to regime interests took a long time to receive accreditation – one
example being Transparency Maroc, which is the country branch of TI (Sater 2007,
92). Even organizations that have succeeded at remaining independent have found
themselves confined to a playing field defined by the regime in their dealing with the
latter, and this amounts to a subtle form of co-optation as well.
Moreover, Sater (Ibid, 150) affirms that the Moroccan state uses another
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classical co-optation mechanism: Resourceful people, who receive public attention
and have “discursive power” on a certain topic, are being brought closer to the
discussion-making center at the expense of losing their autonomy. This is an
integrative strategy, and NGOs have frequently been asked to join consultative
bodies, roundtable conferences, Royal Commissions, and so on. These bodies can
then manage the deliberations on a sensitive issue, or remove it from public debate
altogether and confine it to the Ministries in Rabat (Ibid, 153). For instance, the
human rights organization L’Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) is
known for its recalcitrance and its refusal to fall for the Makhzen’s game. Even so,
the regime set up a Ministry for Human Rights, which threatened to turn the AMDH
into a junior partner in discussions on human rights issues (Ibid. 125; Maghraoui
2008, 204-205).
Human rights issues are some of the most sensitive domains for any
authoritarian regime, and the Moroccan regime has, in contrast to Tunisia, handled
this issue with more diligence in the latter years. Precisely by conceding that
violations had taken place, and by taking the initiative on human rights reform, the
state assumed control of the direction of the human rights debate in Morocco (Sater
2007, 123-128). The state-controlled councils eventually declared the file of
unlawful disappearances to be “closed”, and shifted the focus towards minor
grievances. The deep-seated corruption in the judiciary, the lack of checks and
balances on executive power, media censorship, and limitations on the freedom of
assembly are among the topics that the state deliberately ignores.
In the same way as Tunisia, the Moroccan regime has preferred to emphasize
its achievements pertaining to social, economic and cultural rights, thus downplaying
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the core political and civil rights of the liberal human rights paradigm (Ibid, 126). By
focusing attention on achievements in the socio-economic fields, the authoritarian
state has also brought back the implicit “authoritarian bargain” or “security pact”, to
justify its unceasing grip on power. The Moroccan government has let social
movements appear only within the confined policy domains of local development,
women’s issues, Amazigh issues, and a few other issues. The Moroccan regime has
also, in ways evocative of Ben Ali’s Tunisia, promoted a political ideology of
countrywide, close-knit consensus, of moderation, and the ideal of the “law-abiding
citizen”. This has circumscribed the repertoire of legitimate contention that
organizations may use, something that more militant organizations have paid a high
price for.
The general picture, though, is certainly that the Moroccan regime has
adopted a more flexible approach to emerging civil society than Ben Ali ever did.
The Moroccan regime has been prepared to absorb new tensions and issues, and as
long as it remains the hegemonic actor in society, it has been willing to renegotiate
the content of that hegemony on select matters (Sater 2007, Sater 2010). Mohamed
VI's regime features prominent non-democratic features, but it has struck a new
balance with emerging social forces in a way that Ben Ali's authoritarian state was
never able to equal.
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III.6 The recent economic crisis and accumulated socioeconomic pressures

It is clear that the global economic downturn since 2008 has affected Tunisia
and Morocco negatively, as it came on top of accumulated social and economic
pressures. The Moroccan government claims that repeated reforms have strengthened
the country’s ability to meet such crises. Morocco’s GDP grew despite the crisis, but
this can also be explained by high agricultural outputs (Paciello 2010, 78). Good
crops do not remedy the fact that Morocco has remained highly dependent on food
imports throughout the economic downturn; with food price inflation as high as 6.8
% in 2008. This is a bad figure, and the hike in the cost of living resulted in a surge
of rioting and strikes in various locations countrywide. As I noted above, increased
disenchantment equaled increased repression, for the Makhzen does not want to
weaken its grip on society (Ibid, 94).
The Moroccan regime has been faced with daunting challenges related to the
economic downturn, but it does not have a general solution for solving the multiple
issues. The Moroccan exports sector remains vulnerable to external shocks; because
as much as 76% of all exports go to only a few EU countries – mostly France and
Spain - and decreased demand in these markets have an almost immediate effect on
the local economy. In 2009, the value of exported goods overall fell by 28.1 % (Ibid.
77). Furthermore, a global economic recession affects remittances from Moroccans
living abroad, which constitute an important economic input (Maghraoui 2008, 202203). One study concluded that remittances are so important that if these flows dried
up, an additional one million Moroccans would fall below the poverty threshold
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(Paciello 2010, 93).
The short-term results of the recession have been to worsen pre-existing
problems such as unemployment. The country needs to create 200,000 jobs a year to
keep apace with annual additions to the labor market, but in 2009 for example, only
95,000 jobs were created. An unknown number of jobs were lost, notably in
important sectors such as textiles. In addition, the figures do not count jobs lost in the
informal sector, which might represent the majority of the losses.
The effects of the demographic youth bulge, unemployment, and rural-urban
migration all mean that the informal sector has grown exponentially, and the regime
has mostly tolerated its existence to ensure social peace. The economic problems
over the last three years have also forced more people into this marché parallèle,
where there is no legal or social protection for employees (Ibid, 90).
Lastly, the regime’s response to the crisis betrays the continued democratic
deficiencies of the regime. As is often the case, the King and his advisors moved first
to deal with the situation. All the policies drafted and decreed in response to the crisis
emanated from this narrow circle, while civil society, and even Parliament, were
excluded from the discussions (Ibid, 95). The Makhzen had set up a Higher Council
for Economic Intelligence to monitor the crisis and reach out to the businesses that
were the hardest hit, but key economic actors such as the trade unions were not
invited to give input (Ibid.).
For Tunisia, the crisis also had severe effects, and further undermined
economic growth predictions. As many as 45% of graduates could not find work, and
unrecorded figures were much higher. Recession in Europe lead to reduced
remittance flows, which are crucial to the economy just as in Morocco. Soaring food
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prices also hurt lower and lower middle class families who felt the economic
squeeze: In 2008, a Tunisian family on average spent 36% of their income on basic
foodstuffs, which is a high figure for a country boastful of its solid middle class and
advanced levels of development (Schraeder and Derissi 2011, 7-8). Surveys showed
that an increasing number of Tunisians viewed their economic situation as
deteriorating, and especially the marginalized interior regions of the country were
suffering more than usual (Ibid, 7). And even more than in Morocco, people did not
see Ben Ali dealing with the crisis in any credible manner, or having the legitimacy
to do so.
Just as in Morocco, the informal sector had become a livelihood for those
who could not find other jobs. This sector was vulnerable to police abuse, and
control by businessmen who enforced mafia methods. Street vendors have had to pay
the police to be left in peace; the criminal networks that control the sector have
extorted bribes and commissions, and so on. There are indications that the ruling
“Trabelsis” endeavored to monopolize the informal sector and that this further
undermined their support among elite factions who used to profit from the same
illegal activities (Mamdouh, interview 2011). In Morocco, the Makhzen and the
police forces have actually left the informal sector alone after the uprisings in Tunisia
and Egypt, to avoid any protests from originating in the streets (Hari, Tel Quel 2011,
43). The image of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi immolating himself in Sidi
Bouzid proved a very powerful symbol, and the Makhzen wants to forestall similar
actions.
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III.7 New discourses and popular responses to perceived
injustice

The economic transformations that I have analyzed at length here have
compounded the growing inequalities associated with economic liberalization and
deregulation. They have especially hurt the lower and lower middle classes, and
splintered the middle classes into upwardly and downwardly mobile subgroups
(Farzoun and Zacharia 1995, 275; Karim and Magnus 2008 Online). However, the
young generations of all social groups in Middle Eastern countries have been raised
in a new political and media reality, with new sources of information and new arenas
for debate.
Some scholars argue that globalization and the emerging neo-liberal
economic paradigm have been twinned with a liberal political discourse concerning
democratization and human rights, and that this discourse has been propagated more
fervently than before. Global media have played a role in this regard, by parading
examples of democracy, human rights, accountability and transparency before their
audiences (Cottle 2011, 650). Therefore, the argument runs, people in Middle Eastern
countries, and especially the youth, have a deeper knowledge of these ideals than
ever before, and they are aware of the shortcomings of their own authoritarian
systems. The simple fact that authoritarian leaders increasingly strive to maintain a
liberal façade in their interactions with donors and “Western” powers is interpreted
as evidence that liberal democratic values have gained prominence as the new global
standard. In addition, there is a new set of global institutions and organizations that
promote and enforce human rights with more power than before. The International
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Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), for instance,
represent this new paradigm (Koo and Ramirez 2009; Howard-Hassmann 2005).
Both Ben Ali and Mohamed VI claimed that they had brought their countries
into the era of liberal democracy, human rights, and socio-economic rights and
entitlements. The examples treated at length above demonstrate that this has been
rhetoric with little or no real impact, but it has nonetheless put authoritarian
presidents like Ben Ali in a dilemma. A contrasting claim made in the debate over
democratization prospects in the Middle East is that “Western” powers, i.e. the USA
and the European Union, have refrained from exerting much pressure on Arab states,
worrying more about their own strategic interests and maintaining alliances with
“friendly autocrats” than calling for genuine political reform (Kherigi 2011).
Howbeit, the ascendance of a global paradigm on human rights has also
trickled down to key groups in the Arab world. Such a discourse has arguably had an
uneven impact: The uneven access to resources such as Internet in the region has
limited its expansion. The distribution of such resources typically correlates with
disparities in levels of education and income as well.

Table I. Percentage of Individuals using the Internet in Tunisia and Morocco
2009-2010 7
Country /Year
2009
2010
Tunisia

41.3

49

Morocco

34.1

36.8

7 Source: International Telecommunications Union 2012. Free Statistics Database Online. URL:
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ (accessed January 25, 2012). It is interesting to note that the
percentage of Internet users does not vary with the scale of mobilization during protests. Access to
Internet might help explain how certain discourses are disseminated, but not why protesters were
relatively more numerous in Tunisia than in Morocco.

63

Table II. Literacy Rates and Gross Enrollment in Tertiary Education in Tunisia
and Morocco 8
Totalt Adult Literacy Rate Youth (15-24) Gross Enrollment
Literacy Rate
Ratios
Country/Unit

%

%

%

Tunisia

78

77.9

34

Morocco

55

96.8

13

A different perspective altogether is that people did not need a thorough
cognizance of human rights or democracy to experience a deep sensation of
humiliation from years of enduring corruption, repression, and marginalization. As
we shall see, activists in Tunisia thought there was an inherent need and natural
desire to do something about their situation (Ahmed, interview 2011).
Another inference to keep from my argument so far is that the picture of
North African countries transforming their economies and undercutting sidepayments to domestic groups and thus breaking off the authoritarian bargain could be
more nuanced than first envisaged. At least in Tunisia economic growth has been
impressive in a regional context, and observers should keep in mind that perceptions
of a decline in regime legitimacy there could flow from certain perceptions of
corruption and power abuses, and a lack of fundamental rights and freedoms, just as
well as from purely economic grievances.

8 Sources: UNESCO 2012. Higher Education Statistics Online. URL:
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/tertiary-education.aspx (accessed January 25, 2012),
and World Bank 2012. World Bank Country Database Online. URL: data.worldbank.org/country
(accessed January 25, 2012). Both databases warn of major gender, income and regional
disparities within each category and each country. Enrollment in higher education is clealry much
more prevalent in Tunisia. It is interesting to note that youth literacy rates are high for both
countries.
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III.8 Laying the groundwork for protest: A Summary

To sum up all the preceding pages, one can compare the situation in Morocco
and Tunisia and outline similarities and differences. The regimes have dealt with
economic restructuring for decades, but despite the self-congratulatory rhetoric and
positive statistics, results have been mixed. Macroeconomic stability has not been
combined with thorough institutional reform, with transparent privatization, or
successful attempts to relieve the aggravating socio-economic pressures which
rationalization, increasing economic competition, the demographic explosion, and
inadequate education systems have brought on the most vulnerable sectors in society.
More precisely, neo-liberal reforms have in particular affected the middle
classes that used to enjoy corporatist privileges under the previous economic order.
The disenchantment of this politically crucial class should ring the alarm bells of any
regime. In both Tunisia and Morocco, social unrest in the 1980s and 1990s
inaugurated an era of political liberalization, at least on paper. Morocco did install
genuine reforms and saw a gradual opening of its political space to various voices
and grievances. At the same time, the rates of development of the Moroccan
economy remained weaker than in Tunisia, where the Ben Ali regime could
legitimize its authoritarianism with a discourse of promoting economic growth and
fighting Islamists. The paranoid Tunisian regime labored relentlessly to stifle all
kinds of dissent and eradicate an autonomous civil society from the early 1990s
onwards.
The Moroccan regime also used a discourse of consensus and royal populism
to restrain civil society. It permitted debate on new issues, but kept a monopoly on
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defining the ways in which the debate was to take place, and how to implement
eventual reforms. Moroccan society has seen a number of new organizations, parties,
economic and social interests emerge, while the regime has inscribed a sphere of
“tolerated criticism” from which the Monarch and his Makhzen network are exempt.
All in all, I argue that Morocco took a markedly different path than Tunisia in
the 1990s, and that its interaction with contentious actors reduced the potential for
intense conflict between the regime and challenging forces at a later stage. Besides,
the Tunisian regime suffered more than the Moroccan one from popular resentment
at its corruption and power abuse: People saw a distorted mirror image of their own
grievances in the opulent lifestyle of the Trabelsi family. With few or no channels for
meaningful claims-making, street action has frequently been the last option for
aggrieved groups. In 2010-2011 people in both countries took to the streets again in
protest, but this time discontent proved to be of an unprecedented magnitude.
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IV – Mobilization under adverse conditions

IV.1 Articulating grievances and mobilizing consensus

The preceding sections demonstrated that the first hypothesis of our
conceptual model on mobilization is valid – social and economic problems had
accumulated in Tunisia and Morocco over the last decades, while reform was stifled
by authoritarian regimes intent on preserving the political status quo at all costs. The
way from this situation to a full-scale eruption of protests is a complex one, however,
and the following pages shall map out and compare how these processes took place
in Tunisia and Morocco, and help us assess our other hypotheses.
Doug McAdam (1981, 51) has ascertained that grievances have to be
collectively expressed and defined in order to form a basis for collective action.
Authoritarian and repressive regimes usually nurture a “political culture of fear”,
which is obviously not conducive to the public expression of political opposition. It
follows that in Tunisian and Moroccan societies, the act of sharing grievances has
been mostly low-key, subtle, and restricted in scope.
Needless to say, substantial groups in both countries have felt socio-economic
problems affect their daily lives in the form of unemployment, pauperization, rise in
the cost of living, and so forth. People who have experienced this deterioration as
unjust will seek recognition and confirmation of their problems in discussions with
others; in cafés and marketplaces, in mosques and on the streets, and at the family
table. Naturally, the higher the concentration of people concerned, the more likely it
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is that the people affected will interact, and the larger the mobilization potential is.
Klandermans (1997, 20) echoes other political sociologists who have
confirmed that interpersonal interactions between family, friends and colleagues play
an essential role in the appropriation of collective beliefs. People usually seek to
validate their own beliefs in interaction with significant others – who are often likeminded individuals. Such informal discourse will inevitably be contingent on local
circumstances and the idiosyncratic grievances and interests of people involved, and
in both Tunisia and Morocco several steps had to be accomplished to go from shared
discourse to street action. Moreover, it is very hard to detect and gauge the extent of
such everyday interaction by unemployed people, street vendors, and café patrons,
and this can explain why the unrest came as such a surprise for both political leaders
and Western onlookers. In other words, the people sharing this discourse might
gradually embolden each other to act, while people outside it remain unaware of this
relative strengthening of segments of the public.
In both Tunisia and Morocco, interview respondents acknowledge that these
processes of collective framing were taking place prior to the winter of 2010/2011,
although the political circumstances were different in each country. As we noted
earlier, it is easier to construct a shared identity in opposition to an “adversary” when
this adversary is clearly known (Gamson 1995, 90). In Tunisia, the political regime
revolved around Ben Ali and the cult of his person and political initiatives. It was
therefore natural for people to hold Ben Ali responsible for how things went in the
country.
Ben Ali had been in power for over two decades, and he was an old man. As
an interview respondent affirmed, there was a growing understanding that the
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political situation in the country had to change (Amir, interview 2011). Saida, a
journalist and street activist in Tunis, agreed that there was disquiet concerning who
would inherit power at the Palace in Carthage, because Ben Ali had no heir apparent
(Interview 2011). In particular, people feared that Laila Trabelsi herself would
maneuver to control the selection process for a new leadership. In Morocco, on the
other hand, King Mohamed VI had been in power for merely a decade when protests
erupted, and he is still considered to be a young and dynamic leader by many
Moroccans.
We have already touched upon the differences in how corruption was
perceived in both countries. A prominent political analyst and NGO chairman,
Mamdouh, attested to the impression that Ben Ali was directly implicated in
corruption of all sorts, and that his wife, Leila Trabelsi, was a leading crony
(Interview 2011). The popular discourse about her was especially pungent.
Respondents ranging from UGTT secretaries to journalists portray Trabelsi as a
vehemently disliked icon of greed and rapacity, heading a dynasty viewed as “out of
control”. The outrage felt by most Tunisians at this corruption demonstrates how
unjust people felt such practices to be. To revert to Klandermans (1997, 38), there
was both indignation at the illegitimate (and growing) inequality between the Ben
Ali/Trabelsi clans and the rest of society, and at the totally immoral ways in which
their wealth had been accumulated. Tunisians perceived a deepening corruption in
their society, and more decisively, they perceived that the President himself was
more responsible than anyone for facilitating it.
Corruption has been plaguing Morocco as well, but it is less associated with
the uppermost echelon of power than in Tunisia. Younes M’Jahid concurred with
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Transparency Maroc that privatization has been skewed in favor of the politically
well connected, and that rentier practices have not been abolished (Interviews 2011).
Fundamentally, economic reform has only created new forms of dependence between
the state and society in Morocco. However, the monarch himself is perched above
the scandals of the Moroccan regime. Protesters have often brought pictures of the
King with them to sit-ins and have begged him to solve their problems, since
politicians have been unable to do so (Ibid). The King is widely respected and his
position is founded on a strong traditional imagery and religious authority which
shields him from criticism.
The Monarchy deflects accusations of corruption and mismanagement to the
higher levels of politicians, and bypasses a discredited executive in order to nurture
its support directly with the people. Hence, the King skillfully blurs the fact that he is
in the last instance responsible for nominating the government and intervening in
lucrative business deals (Interviews 2011). Even though corruption and
mismanagement have added to a discourse of alienation between Moroccan society
and a predatory state, the demands for change have been more limited and more
diffuse than they ever were in Tunisia – in large part because the authorities of Ben
Ali and Mohamed VI have been perceived so differently.
Moving on, we must also keep in mind that although collective
understandings on socioeconomic and political problems were widespread
throughout the Tunisian and Moroccan societies, their impacts were different across
different social classes, and many people actually never shared these interpretations.
Representatives from Transparency Maroc and other Moroccan activists conceded
that the regime had been able to “buy” poor people’s acquiescence with cheap bread,
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Ramadan meals, and other populist initiatives (Interviews 2011). On the other hand,
the case of Tunisia illustrates that members of the higher classes had just as often
abstained from any political activism prior to the mass mobilization of January 2011.
Our informant Saida, a journalist with an upper-middle class background, put it like
this:

“I believed in Ben Ali’s regime, I believed in the propaganda. I thought
Tunisia was doing well, we were a very successful country, but we were
not ready for democracy. Like most Tunisians, I was part of the passive,
silent majority. We were disconnected from reality until Sidi Bouzid
happened. December 17, 2010 was a shock for me” (Interview 2011).

In other words, one must be careful not to believe that all parts of
society were brewing with discontent. Some did not have the resources to
participate, while others benefited from the status quo. In a country such as
Tunisia, with high literacy and education rates and less poverty, one can assume
that a higher proportion of the population was politically conscious than in
poorer Morocco. Before the protests, however, the Ben Ali regime was adept at
stifling critical thought. Amira, another journalist and former social worker,
meant that “we were asphyxiated, for regime collaborators monitored everyone
else”. The regime had quenched any form of autonomous expression, be it in
the arts, the academy, the media, or in politics: “There was a war on ambition
and free thinking” (Amira, interview 2011).
The unemployed of Tunisia, and in particular unemployed youth,
represented a “Generation X” that both the regime and society had neglected
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(Ibid.) Together with the downwardly mobile segments of a middle class under
pressure, and the outright poor, they amounted to a large and varied group with
multiple social and economic problems. Seeing no hope, they were often
underemployed street vendors, beggars, delinquents, and even criminals. This
situation was especially severe in the interior and the south of Tunisia, which
have always been at the country’s economic and political periphery.
People in these strata and regions have typically advanced specific
claims for jobs and bread, reminiscent of the demands of Morocco’s poor. Such
demands might have appeared limited to immediate economic and social
concerns, but in fact they were more politically powerful than that. Street
activists Reem, Amira, and others stressed the fact that these groups had had to
endure a deeply felt humiliation derived from their situation, and from the way
they were treated by the state (interviews 2011). Of course they wanted formal
jobs, because jobs ensure at least some degree of economic security, personal
dignity, and autonomy, both from family members and the state.
Instead, the unemployed, informally employed, and underemployed all
remained at the margins of their societies (Amira, interview 2011). Ironically,
these marginalized strata actually encompassed the majority of people in many
poor towns and neighborhoods, and their frustration added to the growing
mobilization potential. Governments were of course worried about the
possibility for unrest, and sometimes used employment programs to co-opt
graduates. As Hibou (2011, 192) states for the case of Tunisia, such Chantiers
de Travail only succeeded in reinforcing the feeling of dependency of the youth
(and hence their sense of humiliation) on the authoritarian state. Driven by the
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state’s incessant need to control these groups, the police treated them abusively,
frisked them, and beat them (Hanafi 2011 Online; Amira, et al. interviews July
2011). Altogether, these groups were profoundly dehumanized. The
mortification resulting from this relation to the state added to the humiliation of
not having work in the first place, and of being ignored or considered of lesser
worth, which turned into an explosive mix that drove Mohamed Bouazizi to
commit suicide, and many people to identify with his desperation (Kefi 2011).
In the least, this has become the dominant narrative of how grievances
accumulated among numerous Tunisians, and how one man saw no other way
out than to enact an extreme form of protest. Soon, people in the periphery, the
unemployed, and in particular the youth, descended on the streets demanding
Dignity! (Reem, et al. 2011). This was a momentous development: Asking for
dignity arguably entailed the wholesale rejection of an entire set of illegitimate
power practices and social and economic relations, escalating in a matter of
weeks to an outright rejection of the Ben Ali regime. Maha, a member of the
human rights organization CNLT in Tunis, emphasized how the slogan “bread,
water, and Ben Ali out!” had appeared only a few days after December 17.
Others were quick to underline that Tunisians label their uprising “La
Révolution de la Dignité” (Maha, Reem, et al., interviews 2011).
We now understand how a certain consensus had been propagated
incrementally in Tunisia and Morocco, founded on fundamental economic and
socio-political problems. The discourse led to a convergence of understandings
– a sort of alignment of individual frames and the gradual emergence of shared
frames. As the journalist Ramzi insisted, the process had been individual and
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“psychological” as well as collective (Interview 2011). Innumerable
interpersonal interactions fostered discourses, shared by a few people at a time,
which confirmed the hardships felt by their members. Typically, these local
groups consisted of people with shared social backgrounds, which in turn
facilitated the creation of shared identities (Klandermans 1997, 20). The fact
that the grievances of these people were so basic (for instance jobs and cheaper
food) made consensus generation easier. Interestingly, I have noted that in the
Tunisian context the many local, particularistic discourses revolving around the
need for employment and food could easily be embedded into a larger frame,
calling for the restoration of dignity for all. Crucially, this rallying cry did not
gain the same momentum in Morocco as it did in Tunisia, and we shall see that
this has had consequences for mobilization there.
Mass protests do not arise in a political vacuum, and one must not forget
that both Tunisia and Morocco had histories of riots. In Morocco, riots occurred
intermittently throughout the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, and people
were accustomed to them as a local, contingent way of expressing grievances.
In Tunisia, the effects of harsher repression, tighter regime control over
information, and higher economic growth, meant that reported incidents of riots
were few until the early 2000s.
However, more than one Tunisian interviewee highlighted that the unrest
in the mining town of Gafsa in 2008 turned out to be a groundbreaking event,
paving the way for the 2011 mass protests (Amir, interview 2011). The Gafsa
riots were a response to the nepotism of local mining company officials, and
were met with heavy repression. When asked why the Gafsa riots did not set off
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countrywide protests, respondents pointed out that it was more difficult to relay
information from the area back then. For instance, Facebook and Twitter were
not commonly used at the time (Reem, Amir, interviews 2011). Furthermore,
members of the trade union UGTT and lawyers from the Tunisian Bar
Association stated frankly that although their members mobilized in Gafsa,
there were few attempts to mobilize elsewhere in sympathy (Interviews 2011).
Gafsa ultimately failed, but Amir and other activists recognize that it set an
example for others, and that it helped cracking the “wall of fear” that the
Tunisian regime had erected (Interviews 2011).
Gafsa left Tunisia simmering with tension, and fed into the oppositional
collective frames already existing. Although many were not aware of what was
going back in 2008, interviewees concur that Gafsa was an important example,
which means that its story must have circulated in Tunisia in the years
following the events. Narratives such as that of Gafsa surely helped to enhance
people’s shared understanding that they were united in their plight, and that
some had the courage to rise up.
Even Tunis City experienced its own acts of resistance before Bouazizi,
curiously with soccer hooligans playing a big role. Dating back to around 2006,
gangs named “Les Ultras” were battling the police at sports events, and they
mostly managed to keep the security forces at bay. Blogger Reem and journalist
Ramzi both credited these groups for dismantling the image of an “invincible”
police, and showing people that street action was indeed feasible (Interviews
2011). This process undoubtedly contributed to the agency – factor - the allimportant conviction that something could be done. In the dense urban quarters
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of Tunis, the narratives about the Ultras’ achievements flowed easily into other
narratives about popular resistance, slowly altering people’s perceptions of
political opportunities and laying the groundwork for contention.
The riots at Gafsa and the running battles at soccer matches in Tunis
were localized eruptions of anger, often with targets immediately present, and
restrained by the limited resources of protesters. For a nationwide awareness to
gain momentum, protesters needed communication tools to spread their
message quickly. As we have already seen, conventional media such as
television, radio, and newspapers were in no way able to disseminate the
discourse of grievances and protest. However, people were getting their
information from other sources, notably from international satellite broadcasters
and the Internet. When as many as one in five Tunisians were maintaining a
profile on Facebook, and one out of two were having regular access to the
Internet, unfiltered news, and knowledge about the malpractices of Ben Ali’s
regime, could be distributed instantly (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 11).
Interviewees highlighted how the use of social media evolved, turning
them into political forums around the time when protests first broke out. The
Tunisian government ran the infamous Ammar404 censorship technology, one
of the most restrictive in the world at the time (Mhenni 2008, Online). Already
in early 2010 a loosely organized movement of bloggers had demonstrated
against Internet censorship in Tunisia, using music, T-shirt logos, and other
innovative expressions of protest (Maha, interview 2011). Two bloggers were
arrested, but their fledgling freedom of expression movement got a lot of
attention. Many “tech-savvy” Tunisians, who even had middle-class
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backgrounds and had benefited from Tunisia’s liberalized economy, understood
that there was an urgent need to deal with Ben Ali’s censorship, oppression and
power abuses. In other words, Tunisia’s mobilization potential increased
sharply.
In addition, activist Saida recognized that scandals revealed by
Wikileaks had added to the simmering resentment. US Ambassadors had
written frankly about the rampant corruption and dictatorial practices of the Ben
Ali regime (Nawaat Online 2010). One thing was to hear stories in cafés and
rumors among friends – getting these stories confirmed by official American
correspondence made people more confident in their collective beliefs (Saida,
interview 2011). Again, one realizes that the alienation between regime and the
rest of society amounted to a kind of political opportunity change, albeit a
change that was difficult to detect. Tarrow (1998, 77) generally dismisses
opportunity changes that pass unnoticed. I argue that in this case changes were
not structural or external to the actors involved, but pertained to their individual
experiences and intersubjective frames. This had consequences for people’s
sense of injustice, agency and shared identity. These were emboldened, but the
enduring stability of the Ben Ali regime made a major revolt seem unlikely to
most observers.
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IV.2 Mobilization online and mobilization in the streets

On December 17 2010, Tunisia was ripe for protest. The following
pages will attempt to give an overview of these events. It is important to keep in
mind that revolutions can never be accurately predicted, and that there was
nothing inevitable about the ways events actually unfolded. Structural problems
had piled up all over the Middle East and North Africa, and finally, one spark
was enough to set the country ablaze.
Mohamed Bouazizi’s hometown Sidi Bouzid was shaken by riots on the
first few days after December 17, and crucially, neighboring towns started to
mobilize in support. At the village and town level, the strong bonds of
communal solidarity and shared identity made local riots and sit-ins quite easy
to organize. However, police brutality began immediately, and fear was
evidently a major hurdle to the sustaining of protests. One must keep in mind
that these communities had collective memories of earlier contention, and they
were well aware of the risks.
There are somewhat divergent narratives concerning how mobilization
gained momentum, and these narratives can generally be grouped into two
categories. The first interpretation, adhered to especially by the young and the
cyber-activists, emphasizes how new social media, and in particular Facebook,
functioned as a “press agency”, and a convenient tool for coordinating the dates
and locations of demonstrations, inviting people to join, and disseminating antiregime discourse in general. People subscribing to this narrative highlight that
Facebook was only a tool to relay information – no one was able to successfully
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assume leadership of the online movement. With its horizontal and inherently
democratic structure, Facebook functioned to coordinate what was a close
approximation to a “leaderless, spontaneous” community. However, it proved
an invaluable resource, a fact which signs in Tunis saying “Merci Facebook”
testify to.
We have already seen how great the reach of online social media in
Tunisia was, and local communities and circles of friends could transmit
information to those who were not directly connected. This amounts to what
Denoueux (1993) calls informal mobilization, a process that typically occurs in
times of crisis, when people are mobilized not by formal organizations but by
networks existing at the workplace, in neighborhoods, or among friends. In his
book Urban Unrest in the Middle East, Denoueux illustrates this concept with
examples from Beirut and Cairo.
The spreading of protests from Sidi Bouzid to neighboring towns was a
pivotal first step in drawing the entire country’s attention to local events. In the
town of Kasserine, police responded to demonstrations with shocking brutality.
Hundreds were killed over the space of a month – more than fifty were killed on
the weekend of 8-10 January alone, as the police targeted funeral processions in
particular. They placed snipers on rooftops and shot at women and children
indiscriminately, while the Ministry of Interior called the police violence “acts
of self defense” against attackers and looters (The Telegraph 2011). Maha, the
CNLT member, explained that the regime paid casseurs, or vandals, to break
shops and sow chaos, providing the security forces with an excuse to attack
anyone who dared leave their homes (Interview 2011).
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From the very first clashes in Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, video clips,
pictures, “Tweets”, and Facebook updates were posted, providing a live feed of
horrifying, poignant images. Ramzi and other informants found it difficult to
explain precisely why people continued to take to the streets under these dire,
life-threatening conditions, but they all made reference to the instinctive impact
of emotions (Interviews 2011; Miladi 2011)
Arguably, people did not make a calculated rational decision as to
whether they should march in the streets or not. The videos of police brutality
posted on Facebook and YouTube became a spectacle to which people could not
stay neutral. Shaken by anger and desperation, they kept returning to the streets
despite the risks (Maha, interview 2011). Tarrow’s (1998, 83) models
acknowledge this mechanism of mobilization: Ruthless repression
paradoxically facilitates outrage, which might drive protests. With repression
and humiliation becoming so palpable, many felt that they had little to lose as
individuals; while conversely, the stakes for their communities were becoming
higher by the day. Saad, member of the LTDH, suggested: “The regime was
dressed down, exposed as totally tyrannical against its own people. Some of us
had known this for a long time...for others, the violence was a wake-up call”
(interview 2011). Maha’s argument is similar: “there was a human sentiment –
an emotional aspect (…), and Facebook was a platform for provoking and
expressing these feelings” (Interview 2011). Referring to Kriesi et al. (1995, 5).
I see that audiovisual media helped politicalize more of the already existing
mobilization potential in the country. People who had no previous experience
with expressing their grievances in public gathered in front of the Ministry of
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the Interior in Tunis, crying: “You are killing the people, killing the youth!”
(Saida, interview 2011).
Harking back to our model, I clearly see that disproportionate repression
fueled an intense feeling of injustice. The rupture between regime and society
was total, and it was easy for people to identify Ben Ali and his system as their
adversary, the concrete target of anger. After mobilization first accelerated, this
process became a rapid, self-reinforcing phenomenon, with people finding
safety in numbers. The spreading of protests increased people’s feeling of
agency, invigorating the shared belief that they could accomplish something as
a collective (Klandermans 1997, 42).
Online social media were fused directly into all these processes. When
information was relayed across the country, more people were touched by
highly emotional narratives and images, and more people felt that they too had
a stake in the collective of protesters. The activists I interviewed commonly
believed that the situation had reached a sort of nationwide “tipping point” that
had made people descend into the streets almost simultaneously. However, I
must point out the evident fact that not everyone joined the protests from the
start. Reem and Saida both exemplify how mobilization spread by example:
Activists who were more aware of the unrest and its causes, who felt a strong
emotional impact from repression, or were simply committed to supporting the
movement early on, pioneered by posting images, status updates, and blog posts
online.
These cyber-activists were braving a certain risk of being monitored,
harassed, or even detained, and a few among them also experienced this.
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Among others, the regime arrested Lina Ben Mhenni, Slim Amamou, and
Yassine Ayari, whose influence it found worrying. These bloggers had been
active online and in the freedom of speech movement for some time. They had
begun the campaign to draw attention to the fledgling unrest in December 2010
and mobilize in sympathy (Cyberdissidents.org 2011). Arrests also conferred a
symbolic role on detained individuals (Reporters sans Frontières 2011). Despite
the salient public profile of these activists, they did not lead the movement:
Rather, committed citizens at all levels played an invaluable role in initiating
and spreading mobilization 9.
Saida, who had a substantial audience due to her radio shows, recalled:
“(...) in December, when I broke the silence about the repression, people started
being afraid of being my friends on Facebook!” (Interview 2011). Fear of the
regime had not lost its grip just yet. According to Reem, when her friends saw
that she was not punished for her online activity, that she was not arrested and
her accounts not hacked, they followed in her footsteps (Interview 2011).
Importantly, these activists acted as opinion leaders in their respective social
milieus.
In a matter of weeks, even the “passive majority” in Tunisia was stirred.
Many were initiated into the action frame of grievances and humiliation for the
first time, and went through the steps of consensus mobilization (awarenessraising) and action mobilization only in a matter of days. The fundamental
character of the popular demands made it possible to construct the necessary
9 It is interesting to note that there is a lot of controversy surrounding leading bloggers in Tunisia,
and that everyone I interviewed objected to the idea that these personalities constituted any form
of moral or organizational “leadership” of the protests. Rather, they functioned as figureheads,
even though there is no consensus on their importance (Interviews 2011).
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shared identity around them, spanning gender, age, socio-economic, and
cultural differences. Online social media made it possible for people to feel part
of a new nationwide community, beyond their face-to-face interactions with
friends and neighbors. Particular grievances at the level of towns and villages
were actively renegotiated and assembled into a nationwide political frame.
The Tunisian protests of December and January 2010/2011 are arguably
a qualitatively new phenomenon, in that online social media played such a key
role. According to one account, “people protested in the streets during the day,
and shared information online at night” (Mandraud 2011) 10. The mise en scène
of a protest movement had become easier than ever before (Zekry, interview
2011). Networks of online activists working under oppressive conditions also
had the advantage of not having a clear center or headquarter which the regime
could target and paralyze. (Al Saffar 2011).
It might appear that coordination online substituted for the need to set up
a coherent, organized movement on the ground, as Social Movement Theories
normally presuppose (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam 2001).
Kriesi et al. purport that a mobilization potential (i.e. people sharing awareness
about shared grievances) needs a framework of both formal organizations and
informal personal networks in order to actually mobilize (1995). Facebook, on
10
Furthermore, international attention to the events could be garnered when mainstream
media, and in particular Al Jazeera, picked up information, images and videos from online
platforms and broadcast them to global audiences. The growing global attention to events in
Tunisia and later other Arab countries surely multiplied the pressure on the Ben Ali regime, and
undermined its legitimacy further. Cottle (2011, 655) argues that the disturbing images from the
protests in Arab countries increased the pressure on “Western” governments to demand that
authoritarian leaders step down. Tunisia was the first theatre of the “Arab Spring”, and the
international pressure on Ben Ali was arguably too timid at that point to compel his departure.
However, activists from the “Anonymous” hacker network attacked the Tunisian
government. This campaign, and support from a range of foreign non-governmental actors,
boosted the morale among Tunisian protesters (Reem, interview 2011; Miladi 2011; Ryan
2011).
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the other hand, permitted the creation of loosely bound communities that could
be created and dissolved in an instant, removing constraints of time and space,
and making communication virtually effortless. Youth with no political
experience could thus transform into activists overnight.
A lot of the youth were also careful to claim that they were not “political
in the traditional sense”, and that online coordination had not created a lasting
political movement (Reem, Ahmed, et al. interviews 2011). Further, youth
activists and journalists that I interviewed argued unequivocally that traditional
Tunisian NGOs had not initiated the wave of protests, but had merely tried to
catch up with, and control, its development (Ibid. 2011).
Reem for instance, claimed that she did not want to be associated with
any particular activist collective, and that this was not a necessary precondition
to “make a difference” online (Interview 2011). Interestingly, several other
interviewees were also skeptical of the more highly profiled activists and their
agendas. Facebook clearly allowed people to maintain their strong sense of
individuality and to converge selectively around a few topics, rather than the
deeper cultural and social integration which activism in more “traditional”
organizations arguably requires (Wanous, Rechers and Malik 1984, 671).
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IV.3 Civil society and the popular movement in Tunisia

This is where I must introduce the other narrative on how mobilization
occurred, the narrative proposed by members of “traditional” and formal civil
society, such as the UGTT and the Tunisian Bar Association. Arguably, the
ephemeral collective identities nurtured on Facebook were not sufficient to
sustain widespread street action in the face of relentless repression.
For example, UGTT members claimed that their cadres in Sidi Bouzid
and elsewhere were among the first to call for protests (UGTT Sousse,
interviews 2011). They were proud of the UGTT’s tradition as a counterweight
to the regime, and as a force the regime could not ignore. According to its
representatives in Sousse, the UGTT had consistently advocated freedom of
association, freedom of expression, and workers’ rights for many years.
External observers have asserted that the UGTT had been suffering from
a deepening division between its activist local branches and the more
accommodationist, i.e. co-opted, central bureau over the last few years (Ryan
2011). However, it is important not to let the passivity of the central level
overshadow the important role played by the lower cadres during the uprising.
Some accounts also perceive a deliberate two-pronged strategy of the UGTT
during these critical days: The UGTT central bureau was negotiating with Ben
Ali, while the regional offices were adding pressure on him in the streets. The
local sections of the UGTT could also take the initiative because they were
further removed from the regime’s coercive capacities and closer to problems
“on the ground” (UGTT Sousse, interviews 2011; Hanafi 2011). Overall, the
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activism of the UGTT during the pre-January 14 unrest proves in any case that
the organization had never been totally co-opted by Ben Ali. Critics who argued
otherwise had overlooked both the size of the organization and its historical
role. The UGTT was indeed older than the Tunisian state structure itself, and a
lot of the Tunisian leadership had acquired political training within its ranks
(Perkins 2007). If the rest of Tunisian civil society was weak, the UGTT was
strong and could become the backbone for protests.
In contrast with the riots in 2008, this time the UGTT cadres were ready
to mobilize in sympathy all over the country. Branch offices were well
connected and well coordinated, and collaborated also with smaller groups such
as the lawyers and the LTDH. The UGTT was effectively a well-established
mass movement, with its own organizational resources, its massive rank-andfile of more than 500,000 members, sharing an identity that was conducive to
supporting popular socio-economic and political demands. Lastly, its cadres
were already skilled at organizing demonstrations. Therefore, the UGTT
claimed that it had been able to “frame and supervise” 11 the mass protests when
they erupted (Ibid). It used text messages, notices, and improvised outdoor
meetings to rally supporters, and marches in major cities typically began at
UGTT offices.
For the trade unionists, protesting was a “duty”, even though repression
continued to be horrendous, and the casualties were many (Ibid). Joining the
union members at the forefront of demonstrations were the lawyers, easily
recognizable in their black robes. Zekry, a member of the Bar Association in

11 The French term “encadrer”, which was used by interviewees here, is difficult to translate.
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Tunis, emphasized how Tunisia’s lawyers had been advocating the rule of law
and fair trials for a century, and detailed how Ben Ali had always sought to
undermine the profession and its guild (Interview 2011). The Bar Association
embodied a strong ethos of opposition to Ben Ali’s unfettered autocracy, and
because of its standing in Tunisian society and its esprit de corps, its members
had dared critique Ben Ali more openly than most. In retaliation, outspoken
lawyers had received threats, been harassed by police, and thrown in jail (Ibid).
The lawyers also shared an acute sense of representing a resourceful, cultivated
leadership in Tunisian society, and a competent avant-garde to the January
protests.
The Bar’s local branches had taken the initiative to rallies in
collaboration with the trade unionists and other groups. The Bar Association’s
Head Office in Tunis knew what was stirring at any time, and approved street
action. On December 30, thousands of lawyers decided to wear black mourning
bands to commemorate the victims of police brutality. The police responded by
harassing them in the streets, and Zekry himself believed this had been a wakeup call for many ordinary Tunisians (Ibid). From then on, the lawyers
symbolized the opposition to the regime. On January 3, when schools and
universities were supposed to have opened after New Year, protests flared up far
and wide. Encouraged by the level of participation, thousands of lawyers
observed a general strike on January 6. All courts in Tunisia stopped
functioning, which showed that state authority itself was being undermined
(Aljazeera English Online 2011).
When faced with these accounts of the role of established organizations,
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most young cyber-activists and journalists admit that these organizations did
play a noteworthy role (Amir, Saida et al. interviews 2011). Traditional forms of
mobilization were important, but NGOs had of course cooperated and
coordinated successfully with the youth groups and cyber-activists. Small
groups of human rights activists, intellectuals, illegal political groups and highprofiled exiles had spent years advocating their own agendas, and jumped onto
the opportunity for protests when it came. However, it was only the masses and
the youth that could provide a “body” and critical mass to this political force
(Saad, interview 2011).
Arguably, there was a generational as well as a cultural difference
between NGO activists and the crowds that thronged the streets. Saad from the
LTDH pointed out that this was not just a “revolution of the young”. He
conceded that the LTDH had not been able to recruit any members since 1994
due to regime constraints, and this indicates that the regime had succeeded in
alienating the youth from oppositional organizations (Ibid). Conversely, the
independent associations had not been adept at integrating youth, and hence the
youth had looked for new spaces to express their own discourses and culture –
eventually finding such spaces online (Ghorbal 2011).
We understand that to listen exclusively to the “Facebook narrative”
gives us a too narrow understanding of how mobilization took place in Tunisia.
Despite decades of authoritarianism and corporatism, the country had a strong
union and a few associations with the capacity to act against the regime. The
organizational ethos of formal organizations such as the UGTT crystallized the
shared identity of their members. Their organizational resources and established
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chains of command (and political weight in the case of the UGTT) accentuated
their sense of agency, so these variables were greatly strengthened as contention
developed. And last, but not least, the long and troubled relationship between
NGOs and the regime itself made it easy to mobilize around shared feelings of
injustice and a clear picture of whom their antagonist was.
The sudden mass movement in Tunisia could therefore rely on a rather
small, but unified and supportive multi-organizational field (Curtis and Zurcher
1973, 53). If this multi-organizational field was fragmented before the protests,
NGOs from across the spectrum merged their efforts when the speed and scale
of mobilization became apparent. These formal organizations might not have
initiated the mass movement or encompassed all its participants, for this
movement far surpassed what the rather small Tunisian NGOs could harness.
However, they acted in alliance, encouraged sustained protests, and provided
logistical support. Again, I emphasize that they subsumed their own
organizational identities under the larger cause of regime change, enabling the
creation of a “national front” against the regime.
To sum up, I appreciate the analysis by interviewee Maha from the
CNLT (Interview 2011). She stated that three collective actors had come
together during the December-January rallies:
•

Formal organizations such as the UGTT, which should not be underestimated
for all the reasons listed above.

•

The new cohort of cyber-activists, whose networks flourished thanks to
online social media. This was a new phenomenon, and the activists had little
organization. They either mobilized based on their own grievances, or relayed
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information from others.
•

“The masses”, which came from all walks of life, and who rallied to the ranks
of the first two. The momentum of protests, and the emotional impact of
repression, compelled more and more people to join. To echo Terchek (1974,
cited in Klandermans 1997, 144), I can conclude that the “indifference
quotient of the general public” was very low, and further - “the trickle soon
turned into a torrent” (Kuran 1991). In accordance with Tarrow’s definition of
cycles of contention, I can add that there was a high rate of both organized
and unorganized participation (1998, 142).

We cannot draw clear boundaries between these three collective actors.
Internet activism, for instance, blurred the distinction between the masses and the
cyber-activists. A more interesting inference seems to be that online mobilization
lowered the threshold for mobilization in the streets for everyone. Ultimately,
however, one was not dependent on Internet access to mobilize: One could rely on,
and align with, “traditional” civil society activists in the streets.
I observe that although Tunisian civil society was largely overlooked as
potential agents of change before the protests, they were stronger than originally
thought, or could mobilize dormant resources quickly. The variable strength of civil
society is essential, and we should not become blinded by the “new social media”paradigm in this case. The variables perception of agency and extent of consensus
mobilization appear to increase in tandem. I prefer to view these two as intervening
factors, closely related with preceding basic variables such as rates of Internet access
and strength of civil society. The variable perception of injustice is another
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fundamental factor, mirrored by its opposite, the question of regime legitimacy 12.
Legitimacy, although a complex notion, is invariably linked to regime practices, and
it is to these practices and interactions with contenders that we must now turn 13.

IV.4 The Response of the Ben Ali Regime

Contrary to what Sidney Tarrow (1998) purports, repression in Tunisia
did not have to be moderate or inconsistent to enable people to protest. As I
have elaborated on previously, the inverse mechanism materialized. Beyond
repression, however, the regime’s responses were muddled and inconsistent.
Amir and Mamdouh are among the analysts who observed how the Tunisian
authorities had no convincing way of dealing with the crisis (Interviews 2011).
The worst repression was allegedly carried out by the security forces that Ben
Ali and Trabelsi kept under their personal control, while other agencies acted
more restrained. For the regime’s part, harsh repression also proved to be a
mistake. My interviewee Mamdouh made the analogy with the way Chairman
Mao Zedong and his wife had led the Cultural Revolution in China: When no
one could check the power of the leading families, the outcome was disastrous
(Interview 2011).
The RCD Party, which had been “holed out” and sidelined by Ben Ali’s
12 In this thesis I have most consistently analyzed the authoritarian bargain as source of regime
legitimacy. Legitimacy/Injustice is another intermediate factor in our model. . It is interesting to
consider that President Ben Ali could not base his regime on traditional legitimacy like the
Moroccan King, and his status as statesman and administrator succumbed to mismanagement and
stagnation – he therefore had to resort increasingly to repression to assert his authority.
13 When power is viewed as illegitimate people might withdraw their cooperation from a regime, and
its power might collapse. This perspective on power was presented by Gene Sharp (1973).
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fragmentation of the state, was also unable to respond to the crisis. All in all, the
authorities lacked competent advisors and ideologists who could have devised a
plan to stem the tide of demands and retake the initiative. The President’s
concessions came too late and belittled the popular demands, and his speeches
to the nation only radicalized the protesters (Ibid; Miladi 2011).
Already before December 17, there was unease among certain business
elites and party figures about the regime and its privatization of power. These
nascent disagreements could have amounted to a small step towards the
“deepening divisions among elites” that Tarrow classifies as a changing
political opportunity (1998, 77-80). However, it was not publicly visible, and a
real elite secession only occurred on the very last days prior to Ben Ali’s flight
on January 14. It is also interesting to note that one does not observe the other
dimensions suggested by Tarrow: Political access was not increased before the
protests, political realignments did not strengthen the protest movement except
at the level of ordinary people, and influential elites only defected to the
opposition in the final phase. Political opportunities rather changed because
ordinary citizens shared a rejectionist discourse, and acquired the networks
required for action mobilization. One thus understands that Tarrow’s
dimensions must be complemented with a social constructivist study, to fully
comprehend how action frames were generated, and how people were
empowered to rise up against a seemingly monolithic, hegemonic authoritarian
regime.
Mobilization continued unabated during the second week of January,
even though the regime’s response remained the same: Police brutality. After
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100,000 people had gathered in Sfax on January 12, Tunisians started realizing
that the point of no return had been attained. The momentum then spiraled
upwards again, and the regime was overtaken by events. On January 14, the
UGTT called a general strike. The country’s leadership was already paralyzed.
Ben Ali fled the same afternoon, defeated by a movement his intelligence
apparatus clearly had been unable to foresee (Al Jazeera English Online, 2011).
Tarrow (1998, 81) characterizes centralized states with a high capacity
for policy implementation as “strong states”. The Ben Ali regime prior to
December 17 2010 appeared relatively strong compared to other Arab states,
with a seemingly hierarchic power apparatus and quite well developed
administrative – especially coercive – resources. This offered demonstrators
with a centralized target. As I have noted, the regime’s strength was twinned
with its insulation from societal pressures: In Kriesi’s terminology, Ben Ali’s
state was highly exclusionary (1995, 40-44). In short, the state had become so
unresponsive to the grievances of Tunisian society, that it was unprepared for
the crisis. Paradoxically, these regime features amounted to an advantage for
protesters (see Tarrow 1998, 82).
Ben Ali's regime had not grasped how its flawed rule had undermined its
own power, and I want to highlight that the popular perception of responsibility
for corruption has emerged as a major variable in my study. As we have seen
repeatedly, the regime had, in contrast to the Monarchy in Morocco, been
totally inflexible in its encounters with domestic resistance. Ben Ali relied
overwhelmingly on force and saw no need to open his political system, not even
to pre-empt challengers like King Mohamed VI did. A second key independent
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variable is emerging here, which I associate closely with regime type: Regime
rigidity/adaptability – the regime's capacity and willingness to compromise
with or co-opt challenging forces in order to survive. Korany (2012,
forthcoming) employs the same variable in his analysis of the “Arab Spring” of
2011.

IV.5 The February 20 Movement and mobilization in
Morocco

In Morocco, the processes of mobilization were evidently quite
different. First, the successful toppling of Ben Ali in Tunisia directly inspired
protests in Morocco. The Arab uprisings of the spring of 2011 are prime
examples of transnational diffusion of contentious politics, as Tarrow (1998)
labels it. Again, the fact that independent media and new social media networks
are unbound by state boundaries entails that information flows much more
freely than before, and that ideas, discourses and action frames can be
appropriated by actors in comparable situations in various locations. This is
exactly what happened in Morocco. International media conveyed compelling
images to Moroccans who had access to them. Youths and activists on
Facebook started discussing whether the country could, and should, experience
something similar to Egypt’s and Tunisia’s ousting of their leaders a few weeks
earlier (Selma, interview 2011). It follows from this that the regional precedents
changed people’s perceptions of what could be done. Here too, their sense of
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agency was awakened.
We immediately observe that Facebook, just like in Tunisia, allowed for
a decentralized, inclusive, and nationwide discourse among youth and activists.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the reach of new social media is
more limited in Morocco than in Tunisia. Generally, the Moroccan population is
more scattered, less resourceful, and consists in large part of an uneducated
rural population and urban proletariat (Boukhars 2011, 31). Therefore, online
mobilization was restricted to those who had access to the technology, and who
were susceptible to support the cause. It is significant that the first circle of
people who planned protests in Morocco were activists in the Rabat area with a
middle-class background (Nizar, Nadia, et al. interviews 2011).
Moroccan NGOs did not initiate the protest movement on Facebook.
Their influence on popular discourse was arguably limited. I have already stated
that Morocco suffered from multiple economic and social problems in recent
years just like Tunisia, and interview respondents confirmed that popular
discourse among many Moroccans was centered on similar economic and social
grievances, such as unemployment and the rising cost of living. Selma, a
member of the February 20 protest Movement, confirmed that people had been
complaining, but that they had been doing it informally, and mostly among
families and friends (Interview 2011). “Bread riots”, strikes, and other forms of
contentious politics had occurred across the country for years, with a wave of
unrest peaking after the financial crisis (Paciello 2010, 94). These were
symptoms of a widespread political malaise in Morocco, although the targets of
contention were probably not defined as unequivocally as in Tunisia.
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Nevertheless, the perception of injustice was strong enough to unclench waves
of protests. Due to the less repressive circumstances in Morocco, oppositional
discourses could be nurtured more openly, but I shall elaborate on why these
discourses turned out to be less potent than their Tunisian counterparts.
The legitimacy of the Moroccan political system has been dropping
during recent years. Significant strata of the Moroccan population had arguably
lost patience with corrupt and inept politicians and weak parliamentarians and
ministers, who were unable to solve the country’s pressing problems. This
national mood spurred several Moroccans to follow events in Tunisia and Egypt
closely, and individuals to start Facebook groups such as “Democracy Now”
and “Moroccans who want dialogue with the King” (Nizar, interview 2011).
The regime's concessions in the 1990s and early 2000s had not been sufficient
to assuage the grievances of those who had lost out from flawed reforms.
Liberalism had undercut state-run programs and affected vulnerable businesses,
without creating promised economic growth.
Thus far, the Moroccan situation resembled Tunisia in several ways. The
discourses were oftentimes the same, although people had more experience with
open contention in Morocco. As I have mentioned, the country had seen its
political opportunity structure change in formal terms since the 1990s, notably
with easier political access for the citizenry by means of elections and the right
to organize political rallies. Anyways, I have noted previously that these
reforms had entailed little de facto improvements in popular influence on
decision-making (Boukhars 2011).
One major difference between Tunisia and Morocco was of course the
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conditions under which civil society could operate. Moroccan NGOs had
experienced attempts at co-optation, divide-and-rule, and infiltration by the
Makhzen, but in general they were considerably less constrained than civil
society in Tunisia. Interestingly, adherents to the February 20 Movement had
divergent interpretations of the roles various NGOs had played in the
Movement’s founding and operation. As in Tunisia, some interview respondents
argued consistently that the protest movement had emerged from communities
set up online, first and foremost on Facebook. The information they had shared
online had permitted the creation of collective action frames inspired by Tunis
and Cairo. These online discourses had been compelling enough to inspire
people to proceed to planning street action. Notably, the first members of the
February 20 group online set up a manifesto, and then permitted people to
discuss freely what they wanted to omit or include in the network’s charter and
list of demands. The end result was a set of political, social, economic, human
rights, and cultural (Amazigh) demands (Selma, interview 2011).
The founders of the February 20 Movement did not vet the list of
participants in any way and their contributions were extremely eclectic, so
consensus could only be built around a “lowest common denominator” of
demands. Selma, Nizar, Amin and other February 20 Movement members all
recounted how the first small group of activists had made a video where they
explained why they wanted to protest, and posted this video online. The video
was credited as a huge success, arguably illustrating that such simple tools were
sufficient to coordinate a mass movement (Interviews 2011).
Just as in Tunisia, the narrative about “spontaneous” protests
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coordinated online is a forceful one, and it reflects the perceptions activists have
of themselves as independent from narrow sectorial interests, political parties,
or formal NGOs. Most of these latter actors have a tainted image in Moroccan
political imagery, whereas engaged youth want to represent a new political
force. Interview respondents were quick to note that the February 20 Movement
was “the first of its kind in Morocco” (Nizar, interview 2011).
Mobilization did not just occur simultaneously among all aggrieved
people, although the activists’ discourse frequently resorts to this image. Some
individuals dared join protest networks before others. Just like in Tunisia, these
founding members of the Movement gained status as symbols, even though
they were not formal leaders. As the number of adherents to the Movement
grew, mobilization became self-reinforcing. This mobilization by example was
much easier to accomplish than in Tunisia, because activists did not have to fear
regime censorship of their online activities or police arrests, although a few
such episodes did occur (Nadia, Transparency Maroc, interviews 2011).
Mobilization in Morocco was then more a question of awareness-raising and
convincing people that participation could yield benefits.
However, I am not arguing that the question of “fear” and repression
was not an obstacle to mobilization in Morocco. According to several activists,
many Moroccans still remember the years of repression - les années de plomb under former King Hassan II. Heavy Makhzen surveillance, the use of secret
prisons, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of activists, torture, and widespread
use of force against rioters are but a few of the vivid memories Moroccans still
have from the 1970s and 1980s (Nadia, interview 2011). Despite an apparent
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modernization and liberalization, the regime’s agents are still omnipresent at all
levels of society. Nizar of the February 20 Movement explained that there were
still “reflexes of restraint” among many, who were therefore reluctant to join the
mass protests (Interview 2011). Selma agreed, stating that people still live under
a collective imagery of servitude to the King (Interview 2011). The February 20
Movement wanted to address this fear, and conversely to empower people to
advance their claims.
All in all, the conditions were much more permitting for protests in
Morocco than in Tunisia, and an answer to the question of why the degree of
contention in Morocco will probably rather be found in the questions of
perceived injustice and agency, civil society strength, and regime flexibility.

IV.4.1 The decisive role of formal organizations in Morocco

Online social media were indeed a catalyst for protests in Morocco, but
civil society also entered the movement at an early stage. Human rights
organizations in Rabat had been holding sit-ins in sympathy with Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya during the winter of 2011, and there had been committees of support
with Tunisia operating for years. Interviews with activists revealed that almost
all of them had previous connections to the cluster of autonomous human rights
organizations in Rabat: Amnesty International, the AMDH, and Transparency
Maroc, to mention some. It was clear that several organizations, and the AMDH
in particular, wanted to assume a leading role in the protest movement from the
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start (Abdallah, Amin, et al., interviews 2011).
Amin, a member of the youth club of the AMDH, underlined that the
Moroccan NGO sector had struggled to recruit youth to its organizations. He
argued that the AMDH had been more successful at this precisely because it
challenged the preconceptions many young people had of NGO activism as
“participation in endless meetings and noisy assemblies” (Interview 2011). In
his view, most NGOs only managed to recruit those who were already
interested in volunteering, while the AMDH was better at reaching out to new
constituencies and generations. Even though conditions for civil society
organizations in Morocco were better than in Tunisia, the cultural and
generational differences that I discern between long-running NGO activists and
youth remind us of the situation in the latter country.
Interestingly, older Moroccan NGO activists expressed surprise at the
level of commitment their youth members showed to the emerging protest
movement. Furthermore, generational cleavages manifested themselves in
debates on strategy. The youth were more impatient and wanted to replicate the
dramatic, yet successful examples of Tunis and Cairo, while “the old guard”
held back and opted for a moderate approach (Abdallah, interview 2011).
Undoubtedly, activists were anxious about how the regime would respond to
such unprecedented mobilization.
While certain activists worked independently of formal NGOs and only
expressed their views online, activist youth belonging either to the AMDH or
the plethora of radical Leftist groups, trade unions, etc. in Morocco were also
active users of new social media. This meant that the distinction between online
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organization and “non-cyber” organization of protests was even more blurred
than in Tunisia.
Regardless of who shaped the agenda, the February 20 Movement
benefited from being portrayed as a genuine youth initiative rather than a
“product” of the activities of mainstream NGOs. The AMDH itself was careful
to underline the Movement’s autonomy and grass-roots character (Ibid). I
interpret this narrative as an integral part of the Movement’s identity, but the
responses of interviewees betray a consistent civil society involvement and
influence.
Amin and Nadia described how civil society activists gathered to form
the first coordination cell of the February 20 Movement (Interviews 2011).
Organizations such as the AMDH had chapters in more than 90 Moroccan
cities, and encouraged these to set up February 20 coalitions around the country.
From the start, experienced activists from established associations formed the
“practical core” of the Movement, and ensured that its momentum was not lost.
The demonstrations on February 20 were therefore planned and announced
weeks in advance, and Amin recalled how young members of the AMDH had
worked day and night to mobilize people leading up to this crucial day
(Interview 2011). The long-established friendships and networks among these
individuals greatly facilitated their joint efforts at pooling their resources
together and preparing for the events.
Activists received substantial logistical support from their primary
organizations, 99 of which established a National Council of Support to the
February 20 Movement. Included were several trade unions, but these did not
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have an influence or capacity comparable to that of the UGTT in Tunisia.
Abdallah, himself leader of a local chapter of the Union Marocaine du Travail
(UMT), elaborated on how the Makhzen had successfully splintered and
weakened the Moroccan trade union movement over decades, and that
membership was very low compared to that of the UGTT. The Moroccan
regime had implemented legislation that undermined the power of union
delegates at the workplace, and several unions were too closely associated with
political parties to be credible representatives of workers’ interests.
Civil society actors argued that their involvement in the Movement
helped mobilization greatly. Traditional mobilization with flyers, posters, and
outreach activities were relatively more important than in Tunisia, because of
the limited reach of Facebook and Moroccan printed media. Television and
radio, which remain under regime control, were not mentioning the Movement
before the first mass rallies; while some minor newspapers were acknowledging
its existence and potential. Still, the large numbers of illiterate people could
only be reached if civil society and trade unions put their resources at the
Movement’s disposal. Hence, the Movement’s online activity was
complemented by the efforts of multiple organizations, and their role increased
over time in an effort to keep up the politicization of sympathetic groups. This
effort arguably became more important as protests dragged on throughout the
spring and summer months of 2011.
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IV.4.2 Challenges to widespread mobilization in Morocco

To further understand the important role of formal organizations for the
February 20 Movement, one can employ Curtis and Zurcher’s concept of multiorganizational fields (1973, 53). In contrast to Tunisia, where the multiorganizational field was small, but well consolidated, the Moroccan field of
formal organizations has been broader and more polarized. Oppositional
organizations ranging from the radical Left to the Islamists have constituted
rival alliances vying for influence over the February 20 Movement. Interview
respondents affirmed that the Movement remained open to anyone interested.
The Leftists and Islamists had a notable capability to bring their followers out in
massive numbers, and were therefore important components of the Movement.
Abdallah rendered how the first core of activists had decided to open the
Movement to everyone, to prevent any subsequent strife between factions in the
streets (Interview 2011). However, the Movement’s spokespersons have
adamantly denied that extremists control them in any organizational sense, and
have pointed out that this is only an allegation the Makhzen has been spreading
to delegitimize the February 20 Movement.
Amin, and other human rights activists who had been involved from the
start, emphasized their personal loyalty to the founding charter of the February
20 Movement, and argued that they had been able to hold the political “center”
free from the interference of either Leftists or Islamists. Both of these “ends of
the political spectrum” ran their own popular initiatives, and could operate
independently from the Movement if they so wanted (Interviews 2011). Thus,
103

the February 20 Movement did not monopolize the socio-political space for
protests in Morocco. One may derive from this discussion that the Moroccan
protest movement was struggling much more than the Tunisian one to forge a
strong sense of unity and shared identity.
In Tunisia, the escalation of protests had been so rapid that there had
been little time to debate strategies, and various political forces were united in a
popular front against the regime. Moreover, formal organizations had not
“unleashed” the unrest in Tunisia, and had been unable to impose any preexisting identity or agenda on it. Although the Tunisian organizational field was
generally weak, the weight of the UGTT ensured that a massive mobilization
could be undertaken through “traditional” channels and with participants from
various age cohorts. The Moroccan organizations clearly lacked the leadership
of a predominant organization like the UGTT which could have kept discipline
at crucial junctures. Moroccan trade unions could not uphold this role. The
AMDH spearheaded the February 20 Movement, but it was still not a mass
organization, and it drew its core members from a limited socioeconomic
stratum. The infighting of NGOs in Morocco weakened them collectively and
undercut their legitimacy in the eyes of non-members. In sum, Morocco scores
lower than expected on civil society strength, because this variable is not only
about the freedom of civil society, but also about the ability of organizations to
use their freedom and acting cohesively.
In its first phase, the February 20 Movement had been hastily built
around a set of shared demands, with a basic shared identity related to these
demands. The Movement’s identity and goals might actually vanish if people
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were forced to choose between the identity of the Movement and the competing
identities of its constituent groups, and this debate arose as the Moroccan
demonstrations became drawn out in time. The February 20 Movement has
managed this tension so far, both because the Movement’s Founding Charter
echoes the grievances participants had before February 20, and which they still
have, and supposedly because the Movement’s identity is malleable. Activists in
Rabat conceded that starting from mid-May 2011, they had shifted their
discourse somewhat from political to social demands, in order to activate the
untapped potential of the poorest classes and forestall a weakening of the
Movement (Amin, Selma, Nadia, interviews 2011).
Some went as far as claiming that the Movement’s initial focus on
politics, and in particular constitutional reform, had been a mistake. This
discourse had mostly appealed to the middle classes, whereas the poor in les
quartiers populaires were indifferent:

“People in the poorer districts are only interested in bread, olive oil,
and so on. They don’t know what parliamentary democracy is, they are
illiterate and they don’t care. If you talk about these things, you will not
trigger their interest” (Amin, interview 2011).

Some interview respondents argued, like in Tunisia, that socio-economic
and political demands could not really be extricated from each other, and that
Moroccans from all walks of life had participated at the first demonstrations,
which had taken place in more than 35 cities (Nizar, interview 2011). However,
the February 20 Movement had clearly not been able to attain a critical mass. It
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appears as if the multi-organizational field which helped drive mobilization in
Morocco was quite divided according to class tiers and that the first waves of
protests had not reached beyond the professional and middle classes to a
sufficient extent, at least not in the capital. In Casablanca, on the other hand,
mobilization among the poor had been a Movement goal from the outset
(Selma, interview 2011).
This new drive in the poorer quarters entailed a shift in focus, meaning
that local and communal issues gained more prominence at the expense of
direct demands for political reform at the central level. The regime probably
welcomed this change, but it was also worried about the possible growth of
demonstrations when the poor joined them. The new strategy also meant that
the moderate Islamists gained greater influence over the February 20
Movement. The Islamists had always been popular among the poor, who felt
alienated by the modernizing rhetoric of the government and left out by the neoliberal state. The Islamists were useful to the February 20 Movement, because
their cadres were well disciplined, and they could provide a sizable pool of
rank-and-file in order to throng the streets and add significance to the
contention (Amin, interview 2011). Abdallah estimated the current number of
protesters each weekend to hover around 300,000, but he believed that the
numbers had to reach the millions for the regime to yield further concessions
(Interview 2011). The largest single rally in the spring had probably never
exceeded 80,000 people (Nizar, interview 2011). Obviously, the scale of this
protest movement never equaled that of the mass demonstrations in Tunisia.
This basic fact, and the understanding that the continued efforts of
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multiple NGOs was required to sustain mobilization throughout the spring,
compels us to ask whether the mobilization potential in Morocco had actually
been relatively limited from the beginning. The narratives about grievances and
injustice that fueled participation might have been less suggestive, and less
emotionally charged, than their Tunisian counterparts. While a large number of
Tunisians felt collectively humiliated by the oppressive state and socioeconomic pressures, Moroccans mobilized along class lines, and a lot of them
apparently lacked a refined understanding of the more political aspects of
demands. In Tunisia, again, people across the country had a very clear
perception of the corruption at the top, which fueled an unprecedented anger.
The political agenda of the Moroccan protesters was limited to
demanding constitutional reforms and improvements in governance and
transparency. This is a total contrast to Tunisia, where the crowds clamored for
the outright overturning of the regime itself. Theirs was a clear-cut, spectacular
demand that stirred people’s emotions and shared feeling of “making history”.
Their revolutionary demands stand in clear contrast to the reformist movement
in Morocco. I want to foreground that the February 20 Movement was very
careful when criticizing the King. As I have presented previously, the King
benefits enormously from a propaganda and traditional imagery that elevates
his person above the failings of the Moroccan regime. The February 20
Movement went further than anyone before it in holding the King accountable,
but they could not have demanded his removal for fear of losing popular
support. This difference on the variable radicalism of protesters' demands is a
fundamental input to the question of why contention was so much less intense
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in Morocco.
The fact that the Makhzen’s coercive apparatus appears less intrusive in
people’s lives than Ben Ali’s security forces were to Tunisians, and that overt
repression is rarely seen in Morocco, also prevented Moroccans from acquiring
the same urgent need to change political conditions in the country. In spite of
towering economic and social problems, the sense of injustice has been less
heightened and people have felt less desperate to act.
If one makes a comparison in terms of socio-economic grievances only,
the mobilization potential in Morocco could have been comparable to that of
Tunisia. Transparency Maroc explained that “the social and economic
grievances in Morocco are the same as in other Arab countries, but the political
regime is different, so the outcome must be different” (Interview 2011). The
reason for why protests have been more modest in Morocco might lie as much
with the regime as with society. It is to the political regime that I now turn.
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IV.4.3 Interactions between protesters and the Moroccan regime

Until the mass protests started to stir up the popular districts in the late
spring of 2011, the Moroccan state did not respond with much repression. The
Makhzen was careful to strike only when the media was absent, and repression
was harsher in more remote locations. Nevertheless, the Moroccan regime was
surely worried about protests from the start, and turned to its preferred methods
of co-optation and pre-emption to take the steam out of this emerging political
force. From the first weeks of February, the Makhzen even used Facebook and
its own media outlets to spread disinformation against activists. The regime
already had a tormented relationship with several of the core NGOs backing the
February 20 Movement, most notably the AMDH.
One of the founding members of the Movement online appeared on
television on February 19, saying that the anticipated protests had been called
off. Other activists immediately refuted this claim, and accused the Makhzen of
bribing people into acquiescence (Nadia, interview 2011). An expedient use of
Facebook and traditional mobilization led to a very successful turnout the
following day. The organizers themselves were surprised at their success, and
the rallies that day made for a paradigmatic event in Moroccan politics.
Marches were not met with police violence, but sit-ins over the following days
were dispersed. The police also used indiscriminate violence when the
protesters organized a small sit-in in May at Tamara, where the Moroccan secret
police is suspected of running a prison (Selma, interview 2011). Furthermore,
the February 20 Movement had recurrent troubles with thugs who called
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themselves “royalists”, who interfered at their rallies, and who had allegedly
been paid by the Makhzen. The police also protected the “royalists”. However,
serious clashes did not erupt between them and anti-regime protesters.
Largely, repression was mild, with few people killed (New York Times
Online 2011). This means that fear was a minor obstacle to participation, and
conversely, that repression did not engender outrage and the ensuing escalation
of protests like it did in Tunisia.

Table III: Estimates of Casualties in Tunisia and Morocco 2011 14
Country

Numbers
219

Tunisia

2

Morocco

While escalation of contention in Tunisia was very swift, and the regime
was unable to get ahead of the developments, the Moroccan regime had a
greater opportunity to respond to the Movement’s demands. The Monarchy and
the Makhzen might also have learned from the mistakes that Ben Ali and
Mubarak had committed. On March 9, the King gave a speech where he
declared that a constitutional reform would take place, the minimum wage
would be increased, and other token social reforms carried out (Abdallah,
interview 2011).
Thus, King Mohamed VI regained the initiative in the political process

14 Sources: BBC News Africa 2011. Tunisia Protests left 200 dead says UN. Online, URL:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12335692 (accessed January 26, 2012) Estimate derived
from UN probes. Morocco source: Tel Quel (484) July 30.
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merely a few weeks after the protests had begun. He was to appoint who would
revise the constitution and how this process would be organized, and he was to
have decisive influence over the final draft. Nevertheless, people responded
with enthusiasm, and claimed that the King had granted them their “Arab
Spring” without violence. This meant that the mass protests lost a lot of their
less dedicated followers. The King’s plan effectively undermined the legitimacy
of the February 20 Movement. The women’s association, l’Association
Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines (ADFM), went so far as to say that the
Movement had lost its very core (Interview 2011). This was arguably not the
case, but the King had successfully appropriated the Movement’s own discourse
to preserve his own hegemony. Nadia deplored: “When the King says he wants
to address poverty, and we also want to address poverty, this creates ambiguity
among people. Who are they going to believe?” (Interview 2011). One after
another, Moroccan NGOs were confronted with the choice of boycotting the
reforms, or bandwagon with the King’s initiative. Almost all chose the last
option.
Mobilization in itself is exhaustive and requires heavy involvement and
commitment by participants and organizations. A true popular movement can
rarely be sustained over time (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In Morocco, the
popular perception of injustice was simply not emotionally intense enough to
nurture prolonged levels of contention, and the numbers receded through the
spring of 2011. Dwindling support arguably affects the perception of agency
among less committed participants, and demobilization becomes a selfreinforcing phenomenon. In Tunisia, the opposite mechanism occurred as we
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have seen, and demobilization only took place after Ben Ali had stepped down.
To continue with the Monarchy’s strategy in early 2011, I underline that
the constitutional drafting process lacked transparency and the final constitution
lacked in clarity and consistency. Still, many NGOs praised the new provisions
and hoped they would entail real improvements. Transparency Maroc argued
that the new draft opened for new anti-corruption legislation. The Union of
Journalists perceived possibilities for improving the Press Code. They also
viewed the threshold on critiquing the King as somewhat lowered 15.
However, the Constitution that was approved by popular referendum on
July 1, 2011 does not safeguard present gains in terms of fundamental civic and
political rights from future threats. Reforms in Morocco remain precarious,
because the Makhzen typically prefers to rule by means of ambiguity, nepotism,
and traditionalism rather than codified laws (Sater 2007; Younes M’Jahid,
interview 2011). The new Constitution has achieved little in terms of improving
predictability in governance or equality before the law, even though popular
optimism continues unabated.
The Moroccan regime has succeeded where Ben Ali failed – by creating
a counter-discourse to the protest movement, and dividing the Moroccan people
accordingly. Interestingly, the more integrative mode of governance in Morocco
might have given the regime an advantage when dealing with protests 16. In

15
Normally, the King's person, the Islamic faith, and the Army, are institutions that are
protected from public debate by the so-called “red lines”. Journalists who transgress them are
punished, but the Union of Journalists conceded that these red lines fluctuate with the political
climate in the country. Around the time of approving the constitution, they had been scaled
back, and some criticism of the Monarchy was even permitted. However, the unpredictable
degree of censorship is precisely a tool for Makhzen to keep Moroccan media disciplined – they
can never know when and how the authorities will react (Younes M'Jahid, interview 2011).
16
King Mohamed VI's multi-centered state might have seemed “weaker” than Ben Ali's
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addition, the ambiguous governance structures of the Monarchy, the
superficially modern institutions of Parliament and courts, and the Makhzen that
permeates the entire structure, make for a difficult protest target 17. Selma
reflected on this, saying “people don’t know to whom, or how, to address their
grievances” (Interview 2011). One understands immediately that the
“perception of injustice”-factor suffered from such a lack of an easily
identifiable antagonist: Corruption and mismanagement were systemic and
severe, but they were not associated with the Head of State like they had been
so expressively in Tunisia. This difference also informed people’s notion of
agency in each country differently.
This discussion has shown that there were fundamental differences
between how the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes interacted with challengers
during the spring of 2011, and that their behavior reflects their more longstanding approaches to oppositional political forces. With reference to the
regime rigidity/adaptability variable I applied in the case of Tunisia, I conclude
that Morocco is situated much more towards the flexible/integrative end of the
spectrum and has been for a long time, and that this can explain why that
country only saw the emergence of a reformist movement with limited goals
which also only gained fewer supporters and had a smaller impact on the
monolithic, insulated autocracy, if one compares them according to Tarrow's criteria of
centralization and implementation capacity (1998, 82). I am not arguing that the Moroccan state
is decentralized in the meaning of “federal”, for its core remains authoritarian. However, it
covers a larger and more diverse population, and encompasses a wider set of economic, social
(17 continued): and political interests, among which the King is the arbiter, as we have seen.
17
One must not exaggerate the usefulness of applying the dichotomies centralizedfragmented and exclusive-inclusive when one analyzes authoritarian states. The Tunisian state
proved more fragmented than expected, while the study has shown how the various Moroccan
institutions are sown together by the organic and personalistic bonds of the Makhzen. With these
caveats in mind I contend that we may still undertake a comparison based on these dimensions.
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regime than did contention in Tunisia.
Lastly, if one looks for Tarrow’s other political opportunity structures in
the case of Morocco, we see that most of them had not, and did not, materialize
during the spring of 2011. Emboldened by the examples of their neighboring
countries, people have expressed their grievances in unprecedented numbers,
and they have managed to collaborate nationwide like they had never done
before. Yet regardless of how pressured the regime felt, contention could not
fracture it. Elites did not defect to the protesters, and the Moroccan regime
remained as pluralistic and flexible, yet as loyal to its leader, as it had always
been.
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V - Conclusion
Our examination and comparison of contentious episodes in Tunisia and
Morocco shows that most of the independent variables I suggested from the
outset were relevant, but that others detected under way were also significant
when explaining differences between the cases. The study supports my
argument that one needs to apply a social constructivist approach to identify
how structural, long-term socio-economic and political changes could help spur
collective action. Despite the decline of the authoritarian corporatist order, I
have observed that both the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes were quite adept at
retaining control of their respective societies, albeit in different ways. If I
restrict the analysis to the political opportunity structures in these countries, I
cannot explain the sudden wave of unrest that emerged in both polities.
However, by bringing in an exploration of the collective action frames that were
generated, and how these affected people’s interpretations of injustice, identity,
and agency, one acquires the tools to understand how this “flash flood” could
occur. The impact of purely economic grievances might also have been less
than I hypothesized.
Indeed, Tunisia and Morocco shared many of the same problems,
resulting from flawed processes of neo-liberal restructuring and a retreat of the
public sector. The demographic boom only exacerbated rising unemployment
figures, while cuts in subsidies led to rising expenses. At the same time, these
countries had vastly expanded their educational systems. The consequence was
that a huge number of students graduated every year with high aspirations,
which the economic and political order could not fulfill.
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The level of economic development and class configurations were quite
different in the two countries, however, with Tunisia having a more advanced
economy and a much larger literate educated middle class than Morocco. This
affected the scope of mobilization. Morocco’s poorer classes were slower to
respond to the call for mobilization, and the February 20 Movement has had to
alter its demands somewhat to appeal to the country’s lower strata. In Tunisia,
the middle class, and the highly educated unemployed, had experienced the Ben
Ali regime as a collective humiliation, and rallied behind a fundamental,
emotionally charged demand for the restoration of dignity.
The anger against the Ben Ali regime was directed at two levels – 1) the
abusive and dehumanizing practices of security forces and regime agents, which
were everywhere in society, and which interfered in all civil, social, cultural,
educational, and political life in the country – and 2) against the President and
his closest coterie of family and advisors, who seemed corrupt beyond repair.
The latter aspect is such a central factor to explain mobilization that I
prefer to single out popular perceptions of responsibility for corruption as a
major variable in my model. The Tunisian public had good opportunities to
observe how the ruling family ran the state as its own private enterprise,
In Morocco, the regime’s internal diversification between the Monarchy
and the Parliament and Government meant that the public was less prone to
keep the King personally responsible for problems identified at the lower rungs
of the administration. Moreover, the Moroccan King and his closest technocrats
managed to appear much more responsive to the problem of corruption.
In general, the Moroccan state seems less insulated from society than
116

Ben Ali’s regime was. The Tunisian state either knew that its legitimacy was
declining, but remained confident it could handle unrest with coercion like it
did in Gafsa, or the regime was too preoccupied with depressing organizational
life and imposing conformity on society to see the warning signs. The
Moroccan state, on the other hand, had gained experience with responding to,
and co-opting popular demands, and maneuvered to counter the February 20
Movement by adopting the latter’s own discourse. Morocco had gone through
an easing of repression and the installation of new channels for popular claimsmaking such as election campaigns and a freer civil society. All these reforms
were heavily flawed, but they created valves which relieve most pressures
against the regime structure.
This ability to adapt to new forms of opposition, to new discourses and
even social media indicate that the Moroccan regime is flexible without
reneging power or democratizing. The variable regime adaptability might be the
single most significant factor detected in this comparative study. I argue further
that regime adaptability must be assessed over time, because a regime that
engages with challengers over time is more likely to pre-empt their demands
and prevent future radical contention, than a harshly repressive authoritarian
state which proves more “brittle” in the face of popular attacks. One must be
cautious no to equate regime flexibility “reform-willingness”: Most
authoritarian states reform only under pressure and political liberalization is
often more rhetoric than reality. Thence my focus on how the Moroccan
government has reinvented its hegemony over the last two decades. Lastly, the
Moroccan regime never made the same promises of social and economic justice
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that the Tunisians were accustomed to, so expectations of what the state would
deliver were always lower.
Our comparative study has shown in general that most of the political
opportunity dimensions that Tarrow’s model encourages us to look for were
absent in our two cases. However, the introduction of new communication
technologies and unprecedented media connectivity has heralded a new era for
organization and mobilization, and this is also true for authoritarian settings.
One must keep in mind that access to such information resources was skewed
along socio-economic class lines, a fact that affected the possibility of
awareness-raising more in poorer, decentralized Morocco than it did in
urbanized middle-class Tunisia. But, in general, the advent of Facebook has
greatly facilitated access to new communities and the sharing of discourses in
all countries.
In this way, the many contingent, localized discourses of alienation,
resentment and resistance found a new space where they could merge into a
larger collective action frame against the political status quo. Facebook helped
collapse constraints of distance and time, and made coordination decentralized,
simultaneous, and almost effortless. Crucially, new social media enabled new
forms of “citizen journalism”, evading regime censorship and raising awareness
among new groups. All in all, a lot of the obstacles for participation were
greatly diminished. For instance, the knowledge that more and more people
committed to join demonstrations removed some of the collective action
problems that might otherwise incur under informal, non-hierarchical and
spontaneous mobilization – in short, agency was enhanced. Consensus
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mobilization, action mobilization, the sharing of strongly moving images and
testimonies all happened at the same time for many, and their pace only
accelerated: One can only separate them for analytical clarity.
Furthermore, our studies have confirmed that traditional mobilization
organized by formal unions and associations played a key role for realizing
successful and sustained mobilization. In Tunisia, where few autonomous
organizations existed, the UGTT became the backbone of a re-energized civil
society. In Morocco, civil society played a vital role in planning protests in
advance, and it was effectively NGO youth which used social media to augment
the mobilization potential. I have also seen that organizations in Tunisia were
more coherent in their actions than the Moroccan NGOs, and that this had
repercussions for the unity and influence of the protest movement. The friction
within the Moroccan NGO field had time to emerge because mobilization was
drawn-out and its momentum relatively low, while in Tunisia NGOs did not
have a choice but to bandwagon with, and pool their resources with, the popular
movement that had burst forth. The variable strength of civil society is more
significant than one might have expected given the “Western” media’s onesided focus on Internet-driven mobilization. I have also suggested that these
factors are interrelated in complex ways, and I will not attempt to make a
graphic model except for summing up my findings in Table VI. Some of these
factors are arguably independent and precedes all others, while factors such as
perceptions of legitimacy/injustice and agency are informed by more structural
factors such as regime type, civil society, and class and education levels.
Interestingly, many of the factors which I have highlighted as
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contrasting my cases are of a rather structural nature, such as regime
type/adaptability. Economic grievances were comparable, but protesters
challenged different modes of governance with unequal intensity.
Factors such as consensus mobilization, feeling of injustice and agency
(where I find more commonalities) are of a more discursive and intersubjective
nature. This supports my claim that oppositional discourses, shared action
frames and similar mechanisms might arise independently of structural
backgrounds, although structural broader state-society relations will affect the
outcome of such contention. This study has maybe more than anything shown
that contention is very difficult to predict, because compelling oppositional
discourses can arise even under the harshest circumstances – Syria is another
recent example of this. In particular, the groundbreaking advent of new social
media has empowered activists in innovative ways in relation to their
authoritarian masters.
I will sum up by presenting how the two cases scored on each of my
variables in a table (see page 120). Lastly, the interplay of forces examined here
deserves further study, and constitutes a fascinating research agenda for
developing new analysis of contentious politics. To succeed, authors must look
both at the macro- and the micro levels, and of course factor in human agency.
Human agency is the decisive variable which will always make contention
impossible to predict, but still unleashes it when it happens. No social science
model can explain or predict all collective action scenarios, but the eclectic and
flexible nature of the modern sub-field leaves it with a good prospect for
improving its models and theories even further.
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Table IV: Overview of Structural and Discursive Variables for Tunisia and
Morocco 18
Variable / Country
Tunisia
Morocco

Economic liberalization

Highly
liberalized

Political liberalization

Not liberalized

Literacy and education
levels
Civil society strength
Regime
type/adaptability
Popular perception on
corruption
Perception on
legitimacy/injustice
Extent of consensus
mobilization
Perception of agency
Speed of mobilization

High levels of
literacy and
education
Weak, but strong
monopoly trade
union
Authoritarian
and unwilling to
reform
Corruption seen
as emanating
from ruling
family
Regime
perceived as
highly
illegitimate
Widespread
consensus
Widely shared
and increasing
notion of agency
Very rapid,
spontaneous

Magnitude of contention

Very large

Radicalism of protesters’
demands

Revolutionary –
demanding
regime change

Liberalized, but
national economy less
modernized and
integrated
Limited reforms
implemented
Relatively low for the
region
Few constraints on
activity but relatively
small and fragmented
Semi-authoritarian,
demonstrating
adaptability
Corruption seen as
endemic but not
associated with Head
of State
Regime legitimacy in
slow decline
Consensus on
grievances divided
along class and
education lines
Relatively strong in
February 2011 but
declining since then
Gradual
Limited
Reformist – political
and social demands
but not regime
change

18 We saw previously that Internet access rates did not vary much across the cases.
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VII - Annex I: Interview Participants
Abdallah – Senior member of the AMDH and UMT trade union in Rabat
ADFM – interview held with several members of the Marrakech branch
Ahmed – youth street activist and student, from Nabeul, Tunisia
Amin – Youth activist and member of the February 20th Movement, Rabat
Amira – Journalist and human rights activist, Tunis
Amir – Journalist and human rights activist, Tunis
Maha – activist of the Conseil National des Libertés en Tunisie (CNLT)
Mamdouh – NGO chairman and experienced pro-democracy activist in Tunis
Marwa, online activist and journalist, Tunis
Nadia – Youth Coordinator at the Association marocaine des droits de l'homme,
Rabat
Nizar – Youth activist and member of the February 20th Movement, Rabat
Ramzi – radio journalist, Tunis
Reem – Youth activist, especially active online (Facebook) in Tunis
Saad – senior member of the Ligue Tunisienne pour les Droits de l'homme
Saida – Journalist, blogger and activist, Tunis
Selma – Youth activist, spokeswoman for the February 20th Movement, Rabat
Transparency Maroc - interview with senior member, Rabat
UGTT Sousse – Interview with senior ranking members.
Younes M'Jahid – Secretary General of the Moroccan Journalists' Union, Rabat
Zekry – Senior member of the Tunisian Bar Association, Tunis
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Annex II: Informed Consent Interviews
The American University in Cairo, Egypt. Summer 2011.
Informed Consent Form
Principal Investigator: Johan Rognlie Roko
Purpose: The purpose of the study is to provide the researcher, a graduate student
doing his thesis in the American University in Cairo, with information about how it
was possible for activists to mobilize so many people in Tunisia and Morocco during
the recent protests.
Procedures: The project relies on interviews with activists. The topics will include:
What sort of ideas and views about the regime were shared among people prior to
protests, how widespread were these perceptions and how did they spread, what role
did the mass media and web sites play for mobilization, in what ways were the
shared ideas of alienation and disillusionment changed into an idea about active
participation and mobilization?
Risks: You are asked to assess your own risks carefully. Do you think you run any
risk of political persecution or repression for talking to me, now or in the future? Are
you willing and interested in talking to me about the topics mentioned above? You
can choose freely the place and time for interviews, and which questions of the
interview you want to respond to.
Benefits: There may be no direct benefits to you from this project.
Alternatives: You can choose not to participate in this project.
Confidentiality: I will only take notes by hand, and these will be safely stored and
protected, and later destroyed. Electronic data which I compile will be safely kept
and protected by password, and they will not be stored in English, Arabic or French.
Electronic data will also be destroyed within a year. Your name will be kept
anonymous in this study unless you ask me to use your real name.
Participant's Rights: It is totally voluntary to participate in this study. If you refuse,
or if you at any time decide to interrupt your participation, you will not suffer any
loss or penalty.
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Contact Person: Any questions you may have about this project can be sent any
time to:
Johan Rognlie Roko, graduate student, American University in Cairo, AUC Ave.,
P.O. Box 74, New Cairo 11835 Egypt.
E-mail: johanrro@aucegypt.edu
Cell phone:+20146868816 or +4747034371.

Signature of the researcher

Signature of participant
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Annex III: Interview Guide

•

How was the legitimacy of the regime perceived over time (Over the last two
decades?)
◦ In what ways have people obtained information about corruption, other
problems. (especially with mainstream media censored).

•

To what extent were ideas explicitly rejecting the Ben Ali Regime circulated
before 17 December 2010? By which means?

•

In what ways were people apathetic/cynical/disillusioned by the previous
socio-economic and political conditions? How did the regime spread fear in
the population?

•

What discourses were shared over the last couple of years which promoted
activism and mobilization? (From passive to active is key here)

•

In your opinion, what did people think about the legitimacy of riots erupting
over the last decade? Eventually which groups sympathized, but remained
passive? In what ways was 2010-2011 different?

•

In what ways were pre-existing social networks (eg families, the workplace,
schools) and shared identities conducive to promoting opposition, and
ultimately, activism?

•

In what ways were pre-existing associations, organizations, and civil society
in general active in promoting and spreading the protests when it began?

•

What role did cyber-networks and new social media (eg Facebook) actually
play for mobilization? Which role did your group play in particular?
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